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Progressive Consumption Taxes 
MITCHELL L. ENGLER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Consumption taxation recently has taken center stage as an enticing, 
and realistic, possibility at the federal level. After years of debate, an 
academic consensus has emerged that favors the consumption tax,' 
especially as it would close significant loopholes under the income tax.2 
The consumption tax's political prospects have increased along with its 
burgeoning intellectual appeal. The Bush Administration, armed with 
enhanced Republican Congressional control, has made fundamental tax 
reform a second-term priority,3 and the Administration has a known 
affinity for the consumption tax.4 
As intellectual and political forces move the consumption tax to the 
forefront, critical issues remain. A conventional retail sales or value-
added tax (VAT) eliminates the current progressive rate structure, 
raising persistent distributional objections.5 In hopes of achieving the 
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. I am grateful to 
Reuven Avi-Yonah, David Carlson, Arthur Jacobson, Kyle Logue, Ed Zelinsky, and all the 
participants at the University of Michigan Law School Tax Policy Workshop for their helpful 
comments. I would also like to thank Michael Giusto, Julia Rubin and Mark Schwed for their valuable 
research assistance. 
I. Joseph Bankman, The Engler-Knoll Consumption Tax Proposal: What Transition Rule Does 
Fairness (or Politics) Require?, 56 SMU L. REV. 83, 83 (2003). 
2. This involves unintended structural loopholes, not intended special preferences such as 
deductions for home mortgage interest. As discussed infra note 82 and accompanying text, such 
intended preferences could be maintained under a consumption tax. 
3. Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Wraps Up Summit with Pledge to Push Agenda Hard in Congress, 
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Dec. 17, 2004, at G-1, G-2 ("Bush reiterated that he plans to use his 
considerable political capital to push for his agenda [including tax reform] in Congress, where the 
Republican party has expanded its majority status."). President Bush established a bipartisan Advisory 
Panel on Federal Tax Reform on January 7, 2005. The panel was charged with recommending ways to 
enhance the fairness, simplicity, and efficiency of the tax code. Several delays prevented the Panel 
from issuing its report before the publication deadline for this Article. See, e.g., Tax Reform Panel 
Postpones Meetings, TAX NoTEs, Sept. 7, 2005, available at LEXIS 2005 TNT 173-28. 
4. Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Says He Will Begin Difficult Effort To Change Tax, Social Security 
Structures, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 5, 2004, at GG-1 (Treasury Dept. has looked at a "number of 
consumption-based taxes" during Bush's first term). 
5. The first change-shifting the tax base from income to consumption-has also raised 
distributional objections due to a perceived elimination of the tax on investment returns. This 
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consumption tax benefits without sacrificing individualized progressivity, 
scholars have increasingly responded with innovative proposals. Two 
such proposals-the "X-tax" and the "Hybrid Approach"-were 
separately analyzed in an important "fundamental tax reform" 
symposium of distinguished tax policy experts.6 Unlike traditional 
consumption tax models, both proposals would tax individuals on their 
wages, even if saved. In recognition that wages deviate from actual 
consumption, both "dual" consumption taxes would supplement the 
wage tax with a second tax. The Hybrid Approach, which I originally 
proposed,' would also tax individuals on the excess of (i) savings 
withdrawals for consumption over (ii) previously-saved wages plus the 
risk-free interest return thereon. The X-tax, originally proposed by 
Professor Bradford,8 would impose a VAT-like tax on businesses, 
modified to allow a wage deduction. 
By further analyzing and showcasing these two inventive ways to tax 
consumption with individualized progressivity, the recent symposium 
significantly furthered the progressive consumption tax cause. Yet, the 
separate analyses of these two independent proposals missed an 
opportunity for even greater advancement. The proposals' striking 
overlap amidst their obvious differences cries out for further 
comparative analysis. On the one hand, the shared characteristics of the 
two proposals highlight the merits of breaking the consumption tax into 
multiple parts, with a progressive wage tax as the first part. Beyond such 
considerable overlap, however, a critical comparative issue arises 
regarding the best supplementary tax for the wage tax. Should it be a 
VAT-like tax on businesses, like the X-tax suggests, or should individuals 
be taxed on savings withdrawals less previously-saved wages, like the 
Hybrid Approach proposes? 
This Article undertakes the much needed comparative analysis and 
identifies the significant advantages of each approach. By limiting 
individual reporting to wages, the X-tax has certain administrative 
advantages over the Hybrid Approach. On the other hand, the X-tax 
objection has decreased in importance, though, as recent scholarship demonstrates flaws in such 
perception. See infra Part I.A. 
6. Leading tax academics and practitioners contributed articles to the SMU Law Review 
symposium edition on fundamental tax reform. Symposium, Incremental and Fundamental Tax 
Reform, 56 SMU L. REV. 1 (2003). Professor David Weisbach analyzed the X-tax. David A. Weisbach, 
Does the X-tax Mark the Spat?, 56 SMU L. REV. 201 (2003). Professor Michael Knoll and I analyzed 
the Hybrid approach, with a commentary by Professor Joseph Bankman. Bankman, supra note 1; 
Mitchell L. Engler & Michael S. Knoll, Simplifying the Transition to a (Progressive) Consumption Tax , 
56 SMU L. REV. 53 (2003). 
7. Mitchell L. Engler, A Progressive Consumption Tax for Individuals: An Alternative Hybrid 
Approach, 54 ALA. L. REV. 1205 (2003). 
8. David F. Bradford, What are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, TAX Norns, Apr. 18, 
1988, at 383, available at LEXIS 39 TAX NOTES 383. 
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would change current law significantly more than the Hybrid Approach, 
changes which are unnecessary in the move to a consumption tax. For 
instance, the X-tax would move the tax on "pass-through" tax 
partnerships from the partners to the partnership itself;9 more generally, 
individuals would pay tax only on "wages." These and other X-tax 
changes exacerbate transition concerns and are more likely to trigger the 
related "status -quo bias" against substantial changes. In favorable 
contrast, the Hybrid Approach largely preserves the current framework 
while shifting to a tax on consumption. 
Is it possible, then, to harmonize the respective strengths of the two 
proposals and craft a progressive consumption tax which minimizes both 
administrative concerns and ancillary changes? Refining my original 
Hybrid Approach, I now propose a new consumption tax which 
supplements the wage tax with (1) a corporate business tax and (2) a 
narrowed individual tax on investments which exempts the following 
from individual reporting: most corporate stock, bank deposits, treasury 
securities, and comparable low-rate interest investments. 
Part I evaluates the recent trends underlying the consumption tax's 
growing support, including loophole proliferation under our current 
income tax system and a better understanding of how income and 
consumption taxes comparatively burden investment returns. Part II 
highlights the shortcomings of the traditional VAT and other "single-
element" consumption taxes. Part III demonstrates how the shared dual 
elements of the X-tax and Hybrid Approach respond to these 
shortcomings. Part IV identifies key differences between the X-tax and 
Hybrid Approach. Part V develops the new proposal, demonstrating its 
superiority over the other leading options and current law. 
I. THE EMERGING CONSUMPTION TAX CASE 
The income versus consumption tax debate has long centered on the 
merits of taxing investment returns, following the traditional belief that a 
consumption tax exempts all investment return relative to an income tax. 
Consumption tax proponents typically argued that the income tax 
burden on investments resulted in too little savings. Income tax 
proponents typically countered on fairness grounds: i.e., the wealthy 
would disproportionately benefit from the consumption tax's exemption 
of investment income. 
Two recent trends have shifted the analysis, though, and drive the 
consumption tax's accelerating support. First, commentators have 
exposed serious flaws in the traditional belief that the consumption tax 
exempts all investment returns relative to a loophole-free income tax. 
Recent commentary shows instead that a consumption tax comparatively 
9. This includes not only state law partnerships but also many limited liability companies. 
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exempts only the low risk-free return. 10 Part I.A provides a new 
demonstration supporting these claims. Second, income tax shelters 
continue to proliferate despite complicated anti-avoidance rules, thereby 
exposing intractable structural problems with the income tax. 11 The 
consumption tax effectively, and simply, corrects the core income tax 
defect, as shown in Part LB. A consumption tax therefore appeals 
independent of the national savings concern because it would close 
income tax loopholes while yielding relatively little of the tax base. 12 
A. LIMITED RISK-FREE EXEMPTION UNDER THE CONSUMPTION TAX 
What explains the long-standing misconception that the 
consumption tax exempts all investment return compared to an income 
tax?'3 A subtle, but flawed, assumption regarding investment decisions 
provides the answer. The misconception implicitly assumes that savers 
would increase their risky investments with the additional funds available 
to them prior to consumption under a consumption tax. 14 As evidenced 
by the first example below, savers appear to "avoid" tax on their 
profitable investments under this assumption, because the extra pretax 
return from the increased investments equals the tax on all the 
investment returns. By focusing solely on the upside, the traditional view 
disregards the greater downside risk of loss from increased risky 
investments, as evidenced by the second and third examples. 
Assume taxpayer (T) earns a $100,000 salary in 2004; payable on 
12/31/04. T saves the entire salary for consumption one year later on 
12/31/05. 15 T invests all after-tax wages in X Corporation stock. The X 
IO. E.g. , Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the Choice of Tax Base, 52 
TAX L. REV. 17 (1996); Alvin C. Warren, Jr. , How Much Capital Income Taxed Under an Income Tax 
Is Exempt Under a Cash Flow Tax?, 52 TAX L. REv. I , 16 (1996). The real risk-free rate has been quite 
low over time, with the short-term rate averaging about 0.5% over a recent sixty-year period. Joseph 
Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate 
about Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REv. 377, 387-90 (1992). The figure is somewhat higher for 
long-term debt. The real, rather than the nominal, risk-free return is appropriate given the general 
agreement that even an income tax should exempt the inflationary component of investment return. 
See Barbara H. Fried, Fairness and the Consumption Tax, 44 STAN. L. REv. 961 , 985 (1992). 
11. Some have labeled the current system a hybrid income/consumption tax because it has some 
consumption elements (e.g., the treatment of qualified retirement savings). E.g., Edward J. McCaffery, 
Tax Policy Under a Hybrid Income-Consumption Tax , 70 TEX. L. REV. n45, n46 (1992). This 
discussion nonetheless refers to the current system as an "income tax," consistent with its historical 
label and underlying core structure. 
12. This concern over savings might, of course, lend additional support to the consumption tax. 
13. See Joseph Bankman & Barbara H. Fried, Winners and Losers in the Shift to a Consumption 
Tax, 86 GEO. L.J. 539, 541 (1998) (" [M]ost legal commentators have traditionally assumed that shifting 
from an income to a consumption tax would affect all returns (by] moving them in each case from a 
positive to zero rate of tax. Over the last 15 years, commentators have chipped away at the standard 
analysis of a consumption tax as repealing the existing (positive) tax on all (investment returns]."). 
14. Additional funds are available because a conventional consumption tax defers the tax on 
saved wages until consumption. 
15. Such extreme savings of 100% is considered for ease of exposition. The demonstrated 
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stock doubles in value over the one-year investment period. A flat 40% 
tax rate applies under either the income tax or the consumption tax. 16 
Example I begins by highlighting the source of the misconception 
regarding taxation of risky returns. 
Example IA (Income Tax Results): Under a 40% income tax rate, T 
owes $40,000 tax in 2004 on $100,000 of wages.17 T invests the 
remaining $60,000 in X Corporation stock. The stock investment is sold 
on December 31 , 2005 for $120,000. T reports a $60,000 stock gain, 
resulting in a $24,000 tax liability. This leaves $96,000 of after-tax funds 
available for consumption. 
Example IB (Consumption Tax Results): To facilitate the comparison 
to the income tax, consider the cash flow version of the consumption 
tax. The cash flow tax converts the current income tax into a 
consumption tax through two primary adjustments: 18 (i) an unlimited 
deduction of new savings,'9 and (ii) the inclusion of savings withdrawals 
for consumption. Under such a cash flow (consumption) tax, T owes no 
tax in 2004. T invests $100,000 of wages in X Corporation stock, which 
is sold one year later for $200,000.'0 T owes total tax of $80,000 on the 
$200,000 "savings withdrawals," leaving $120,000 of after-tax funds 
available for consumption." 
The old view that a consumption tax comparatively exempts all 
investment return appears in three different ways from the Example 1 
results, tabulated as follows: 
Income Tax Consumption Tax 
12/31/04 Investment $60,000 $100,000 
2005 Profits $60,000 $100,000 
12/31/05 Pretax Funds $uo,ooo $200,000 
2005 Total Tax $24,00022 $80,00023 
12/31/05 After-Tax Funds $96,000 $nw,ooo 
principles remain applicable where T saves less than all his salary. 
16. A flat tax rate is assumed for ease of exposition in developing the initial key principles. 
17. Under an income tax, even "saved wages" generally are taxed in the current year. There is a 
limited exception for qualified retirement savings that does not apply on these facts . See infra note 163 
and accompanying text for a discussion of qualified retirement savings under a consumption tax. 
18. In addition, subject to possible exceptions, loan proceeds would increase the tax base while 
loan repayments would reduce the tax base. For a more detailed discussion of loans, see Engler, supra 
note 7. 
19. Under the current income tax, limited amounts of qualified savings are deductible. See 
discussion of retirement savings, infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
20. This assumes T earns the same pretax return regardless of the investment amount. See infra 
note 35. 
21. $200,000 - (40% X $200,000) . 
22. 40% X $6o,OOO. 
23, 40% X $200,000. 
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First, the 2005 after-tax funds under the consumption tax ($120,000) 
match the 2005 pretax funds under the income tax, suggesting an implicit 
consumption tax exemption for the stock gains.24 Similarly, T has $24,000 
of additional after-tax funds in 2005 under the consumption tax 
($120,000 - $96,000), equal to the full tax on the investment profit under 
the income tax. Finally, compare the different pretax stock gains: $60,000 
under the income tax versus $100,000 under the consumption tax. The 
extra $40,000 pretax profit under the consumption tax equals the total 
consumption tax collections on T's $100,000 aggregate investment profit 
($100,000 X 40%).25 
Example I masks the real reason for the full "exemption" of the 
risky stock gain by considering only a profitable stock investment. 
Increasing the risky stock investment from $60,000 to $100,000 exposes T 
to greater risk of loss if X stock declines in value. 
Example 2 demonstrates this greater loss exposure by assuming that 
the X stock experiences a 50% decline in value during 2005. 
Example 2A (Income Tax Results): Under the income tax, T's $60,000 
X stock investment is sold for $30,000 on December 31, 2005. T reports 
a $30,000 loss on the sale. Such tax loss saves T $12,000 tax ($30,000 x 
40% ), assuming that tax losses are deductible against other taxable 
income.26 The stock investment therefore increases T's after-tax funds 
available for consumption in 2005 by $42,000: $30,000 stock sale 
proceeds plus a $12,000 reduction in otherwise payable income taxes. 
Example 28 (Consumption Tax Results): Under the cash flow tax, T 
sells the $100,000 X stock investment for $50,000 on December 31, 
2005. T owes $20,000 tax on the $50,000 savings withdrawal ($50,000 x 
40% ). This leaves T with $30,000 after-tax funds available for 
consumption in 2005. 
24. It is an implicit exemption because that tax actually is collected under the cash flow tax on the 
full investment return. 
25. T's total tax bill of $80,000 can be divided into a $40,000 deferred payment on the $100,000 in 
wages plus a $40,000 payment on the $100,000 stock gain. Another way to see the apparent exemption 
is that this $40,000 tax on the stock gain equals the $16,000 tax on the additional $40,000 pretax return 
plus the $24,000 tax on the investment profits under the income tax. 
26. This is appropriate under the income tax as the original investment was already subject to tax. 
The particular form of a real-world income tax might deny the taxpayer the full value from the loss (a 
"full loss offset"). A smaller decline in loss exposure results, e.g., to the extent losses do not generate 
(i) current tax savings (i.e., a deduction against other taxable income for the year or a government 
refund if the loss exceeds other net income for the year), or (ii) future tax savings through a loss 
carryforward, increased by interest as compensation for deferral. This can arise where limitations are 
placed on loss deductibility. See, for example, the current rule limiting capital loss deductions to the 
capital gain income plus $3,000. I.R.C. § I2II(b) (2000). While unused capital losses carry forward, the 
taxpayer does not receive full value from the loss because the carryover loss amount is not increased 
by an interest factor. In theory, however, an income tax arguably should allow full loss compensation. 
In fact , the current restrictions must be analyzed in the context of the current income tax which has 
practical shortcomings, such as the selective loss realization problem discussed infra notes 58-oo and 
accompanying text. 
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The additional loss exposure under the consumption tax can be seen in 
several ways from the Example 2 results, tabulated as follows: 
Income Tax Consumption Tax 
2004 Investment $60,000 $100,000 
2005 Pretax Return ($30,000 loss) ($50,000 loss) 
2005 Pretax Funds $30,000 $50,000 
2005 Tax or Savings $ , 27 12,000 savings $20,00028 
2005 After-Tax Funds $42,000 $30,000 
Once again, T's 2005 after-tax funds under the consumption tax 
match the 2005 pretax funds under the income tax. In this case, however, 
Tis $12,000 better off under the income tax due to the $30,000 income 
tax loss and the 40% tax rate. The $12,000 difference also can be 
determined by focusing on the extra $20,000 investment loss under the 
consumption tax. T bears 60% of this additional pretax loss because the 
government bears a percentage of T's losses equal to the tax rate under 
either the consumption or income tax.29 
So how much of the full investment return "exemption" in Example 
1 was attributable to the additional risk of loss, rather than the shift to a 
consumption tax? After equating T's risk of loss under the income and 
consumption taxes, Example 3 below demonstrates the new view that the 
consumption tax exempts only the risk-free return. 
Assume now that T invests the additional $40,000 available to him 
on December 31, 2004 under the consumption tax in a risk-free Treasury 
note, which pays interest at an assumed 10% risk-free rate. T invests the 
other $60,000 in the risky X stock. Tracking Examples I and 2, assume, in 
the alternative, that the X stock either doubles in value or declines by 
50%. 
27. 40% x $30,000. This assumes the $30,000 tax loss (i) offsets other taxable income for the 
current year, (ii) losses carry forward with an interest adjustment, or (iii) the government provides a 
current refund for net losses in the current year. See supra ,1ote 26. 
28. 40% X $50,000. 
29. Loss sharing results under the cash flow tax because pretax losses reduce savings available for 
withdrawal, which are subject to tax. Loss sharing results under the income tax because taxpayers 
report gain or loss based on the difference between purchase and sales prices. The following proof 
shows the equivalency of the two textual explanations of the $12,000 difference. The first way-simply 
the loss under the income tax times the tax rate-can be expressed as L x TR. The second explanation 
takes the product of (1) one minus the tax rate and (2) the additional pretax loss, which equals the 
excess of (i) the product of the income tax loss, and one divided by one minus the tax rate (because 
that equals the amount by which T increased the stock investment) over (ii) the income tax loss. This 
can be expressed as (r - TR) x {[L x r/(r - TR)] - L}. This expression becomes (r - TR) x {[U(r -
TR)] - L}, then L- (L x (r -TR)], then L- L + (L x TR), and finally the same L x TR. 
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Example 3A (X Stock Doubles): The Treasury note pays $44,000 one 
year later ($40,000 plus $4,000 interest). Assuming the X stock doubles 
in value, T sells it for $120,000 on December 31, 2005. T has total funds 
of $164,000 before taxes. After paying the 40% cash flow tax, T has 
$98,400 available for consumption on December 31, 2005.30 
Example 3B (X Stock Declines by 50%): Assuming the X stock 
declines by 50%, T sells it for $30,000 on December 31 , 2005. T has 
total funds of $74,000 before taxes ($30,000 stock sale proceeds plus 
the $44,000 treasury note proceeds above). After paying the 40% cash 
flow tax, T has $44,400 available for consumption on December 31, 
2005.3' 
The 2005 after-tax funds from all three examples, tabulated below, 
support the new view that a consumption tax comparatively exempts 
only the risk-free return. 
Income Tax Cash Flow Tax: Cash Flow Tax: 
New View Old View 
100% stock increase $96,000 $98,400 $120,000 
50% decline in stock $42,000 $44,400 $30,000 
Under the new view, the consumption tax increases T's after-tax 
funds by a narrow, and constant, amount of $2,400 (compare the second 
and third columns). This contrasts favorably to the old view, which leaves 
T with significantly more or less after-tax funds depending on the stock's 
performance (compare the second and fourth columns). The new view's 
superiority is based on its sounder assumption of equal tolerance for 
stock market losses under the alternate tax structures.32 The steady 
$2,400 difference under the new view also quantifies the consumption 
tax's limited risk-free exemption. The $2,400 excess under the 
30, 40% X $164,000 = $65,000. $164,000 - $65,6oo = $98,400. 
3!. 40% X $74,000 = $29,000. $74,000 - $29,6oo = $44,400. 
32. This is suggested by the fact that T is $54,000 worse off under both the second and third 
columns if X stock declines by 50% rather than doubling in value. This does not properly quantify the 
true risk of loss, of course, because this compares one loss scenario to one positive return possibility. A 
better comparison would contrast the 50% stock decline scenario to an alternative under which T 
invested all funds in risk-free treasury notes yielding ro%. If so, T would have had (r) $66,ooo under 
the consumption tax ($rro,ooo Treasury Note proceeds less $44,000 tax thereon) and (2) $63,6oo 
under the income tax ($66,000 Treasury Note proceeds less 40% tax times the $6,000 interest return). 
Thus, T loses a steady $2r ,6oo under either the income tax or the consumption tax ifT invests $6o,ooo 
in the stock under both taxes ($63,6oo - $42,000 under the income tax; $66,ooo - $44,400 under the 
consumption tax). In contrast, T loses $36,000 if T increases his risky stock investment to $100,000 
under the consumption tax ($66,000 - $30,000). 
One difference between the income and consumption taxes should be noted: T receives an 
additional risk-free return under the consumption tax, which might have an impact on T's investment 
decisions. Nonetheless, the new view does seem to make a sounder assumption than the old view, even 
taking into account such difference. 
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consumption tax equals the tax rate times only'the risk-free return on the 
saved wages under the income tax (40% x 10% x $60,000).33 Accordingly, 
risky investment returns would not become exempt by virtue of a shift to 
the consumption tax.34 
Finally, the above analysis generally holds true even if T invested the 
full $100,000 wages in the risky stock under the consumption tax. If so, T 
similarly should, and could, increase the riskiness of his portfolio under 
the income tax given this higher risk tolerance.35 This could be done by, 
33. A conceptual explanation for the consumption tax's limited risk-free exemption follows. The 
cash flow tax differs from the income tax in that taxpayers retain until consumption the tax on saved 
wages; this equals the tax rate times the pretax saved wages ("TR x SW"). Taxpayers should make 
similar risky investments under the income and consumption taxes because, in either case, they share 
gains and losses with the government. This assumes the same, constant tax rate under the income and 
consumption taxes and, as discussed infra note 26, a theoretically-sound full loss offset under the 
income tax. The cash flow benefit from tax deferral on saved wages therefore equals the risk-free 
return ("RFR") on the deferred tax because taxpayers generally should invest it in risk-free assets: 
RFR x TR x SW. As suggested infra note 35 and accompanying text, taxpayers should use the extra 
cash to purchase risky assets in certain cases, but this does not change the general analysis. The RFR x 
TR x SW pretax return must be reduced because such return will be taxed when withdrawn for 
consumption, leaving: RFR x TR x SW x (1 - TR). Reordered as TR x RFR x (1 - TR) x SW, 
taxpayers "avoid" tax on the risk-free return generated by the after-tax saved wages. This assumes the 
same rate applies to wages and the risky returns. The calculation changes if a lower rate applies to the 
risky returns under the income tax ( e.g., a lower capital gains tax). If so, the difference between the 
income and the consumption tax narrows because the taxpayer should invest less in the risky asset 
under the income tax than under the consumption tax. This results because the taxpayer has to share 
less of the risky profits with the government under the income tax's lower risky rate. See David A. 
Weisbach, Taxation and Risk-Taking with Multiple Tax Rates, 57 NAT'L TAx J. 229 (2004) (providing 
formula for calculating such reduction). 
34. This is not to say that a consumption tax necessarily burdens risky investment returns. As 
discussed below, investors might be able to avoid the burden by increasing their investment amounts. 
This would not be a new or relative exemption under the consumption tax as a similar possibility exists 
under the income tax. See infra note 35. 
35. This possibility of increased risky investments under either the consumption or income tax 
explains the recent commentary that both income and consumption taxes exempt certain risky returns. 
See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note ro. The argument follows from the concept that the government 
shares both gains and losses with taxpayers in a percentage equal to the tax rate. If so, taxpayers 
arguably can negate the risky investment return by increasing the risky investments by a factor equal 
to one divided by one minus the tax rate. Consider again the basic facts of Example 1 but now assume 
a stand-alone wage tax which expressly exempts investment returns. T owes $40,000 tax on 12/31/04, 
leaving $6o,ooo to invest in X stock. If the stock doubles in value, T is left with $120,000 for 
consumption. As evidenced by Example 1B, T achieves the same result if he makes a $100,000 stock 
investment with the $100,000 available funds. While T formally paid tax on both the $100,000 wages 
and the $100,000 investment return, a comparison to the stand-alone wage tax evidences the lack of 
any burden on the risky return. Restated, T should be comfortable making such increased investment 
under the consumption tax-relative to the wage tax with the investment return exemption-because 
the government bears 40% of T's loss under the consumption, but not the stand-alone wage tax. On 
the positive side, increasing the investment amount by 1/(1 - t) "avoids" the tax because T keeps 
(1 - t) x P after taxes where t equals the tax rate and P equals the pretax profits. This argument 
requires certain assumptions such as constant tax rates and the lack of market pricing changes if 
investors increase their investment amounts in this fashion. The merits of the assumptions, and hence 
the argument regarding the risky return exemption, need not be resolved for purposes of the 
consumption/income tax debate. This results because the income and consumption taxes generally 
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e.g., (1) liquidating risk-free assets, if any, to purchase more X stock; (2) 
purchasing even riskier investments with the $60,000 after-tax saved 
wages; or (3) using leverage to acquire more X stock (either options or 
regular loans). And the difference between the income and consumption 
taxes generally remains limited to the risk-free return even under such 
changed facts. 36 
B. CONSUMPTION TAX CORRECTS CORE INCOME TAX DEFECT 
The prior demonstration assumed away some long-standing practical 
problems under the income tax. This section now considers the real-
world shortcomings of the income tax, which solidify the consumption 
tax case. This section demonstrates how the consumption tax simply 
corrects the income tax's structural problem. 
I. Realization Defects Under the Income Tax 
The income tax problems stem from the "realization" requirement 
under which income is reported only when "realized" through a market 
transaction like the sale of an asset or payment of a salary.37 The 
realization requirement raises a number of income tax avoidance 
opportunities, which fall into three broad categories.38 First, taxpayers 
treat the risky returns the same; the difference generally relates solely to the risk-free return. This can 
be seen from the income tax calculation in note 36, demonstrating how T could boost his after-tax 
funds to $117,6oo by similarly making a $100,000 stock investment under the income tax (e.g. , by 
borrowing funds). The difference between the income and consumption taxes therefore is limited to 
only $2,400, which equals only the risk-free return. See supra text accompanying note 33. 
36. Recall for example the consumption tax results of Example 1B where T invested the full 
$100,000 in the risky X stock which doubled in value. T ended up with $120,000 after-tax funds for 
consumption. Now assume T similarly purchased $100,000 worth of X stock under the income tax by, 
e.g., borrowing $40,000 at the 10% risk-free rate. If so, T's after-tax consumption would be $117,6oo 
($200,000 sales proceeds - ($44,000 debt repayment+ $38,400 tax bill (40% x $96,000 profit: $100,000 
stock gain less $4,000 interest expense)]}. This once again is $2,400 less than the consumption tax 
results. The difference between the income and cash flow (consumption) tax would increase somewhat 
if T incurred borrowing costs in excess of the risk-free rate. The general analysis nonetheless holds for 
the following reasons: First, as suggested in the text, taxpayers might be able to increase their risky 
investments without incurring borrowing costs in excess of the risk-free rate (through options, 
liquidation of risk-free assets, purchase of riskier stocks, etc.). Second, certain unconventional 
consumption tax forms-such as the dual Hybrid Approach analyzed infra Part III.A.1-also collect 
tax on saved wages at the wage date, leaving taxpayers in the same position as under the income tax 
regarding available investment funds. Finally, even in the limited cases where T would have to incur 
excess borrowing costs under the income tax, the basic point regarding T's ability to increase his 
portfolio's riskiness under the income tax significantly undercuts the old view that the consumption tax 
comparatively exempts the full risky return. For a deeper discussion of these issues, see Engler, supra 
note 7; Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES, 
Apr. 5, 2004, at 91, available at LEXIS 2004 TNT 66-48. 
37. E.g., I.RC. § roor (2000) ("[T]he gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be 
the amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis") (emphasis added). There are some limited 
exceptions under the current structure which apply only in specific designated areas. See, e.g., I.RC. 
§ 475 (requiring securities dealers to report market appreciation even on retained securities). 
38. For a discussion of difficulties with an alternate accretion-based income tax, see infra notes 
62--03 and accompanying text (legitimate valuation and administrative reasons underlie the realization 
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can defer their taxes without interest by delaying realization. As 
evidenced by Example 4, this reduces the tax burden under time value of 
money principles.39 
Assume T purchased Z stock for $100,000 on 1/1/04 and it 
appreciates in value to $200,000 as of 12/31/04.40 T contemplates selling 
the stock on 12/31/04 and reinvesting the $200,000 in Y Corp. stock. T 
will consume all after-tax proceeds one year later on 12/31/05. The Zand 
Y stocks both double in value during 2005.41 Assume the income tax 
applies a flat 40% rate to all income, including capital gains.42 T holds 
$40,000 of cash which will be used to pay the tax if the Z stock is sold on 
12/31/04; if T retains the Z stock until 2005, the $40,000 will be invested 
in a 10% one-year Treasury note.43 How much after-tax consumption will 
T have, first if he sells the Z stock for reinvestment on 12/31/04, and 
second if he holds the Z stock until consumption on 12/31/05? 
Example 4A <Sells for Reinvestment): T owes $40,000 tax in 2004 if he 
sells the Z stock for a profit of $100,000. If T sells the Y stock for 
400,000 on 12/31/05, T owes $80,000 tax on the $200,000 Y stock gain. 
This leaves $320,000 for consumption. 
Example 4B (Holds Until Consumption): T receives pretax proceeds of 
$444,000 on 12/31/05: $400,000 from the Z stock and $44,000 from the 
Treasury Note. T reports $304,000 of income: $300,000 from the Z 
stock and $4,000 from the Treasury Note. After paying the tax of 
$121,600, T has $322,400 for consumption. 
What should we make of the $2,400 difference? At the outset, 
consider two conceptual explanations for the different results. As 
evidenced by the same $2,400 difference seen above in Section A, T 
effectively converted the income tax into a consumption tax by deferring 
realization until consumption. As such, T avoided the tax on the risk-free 
requirement) . 
39. Deferral of taxes without interest lowers the true cost because a lesser figure can be set aside 
today to meet the (future) tax liability; i.e. , the lesser figure can be invested and earn interest. The tax 
system imposes a deferral charge only in very limited circumstances. A more comprehensive interest 
charge regime has proven elusive despite the efforts of many commentators. See Edward A. Zelinsky, 
For Realization: Income Taxation, Sectoral Accretionism and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 
CARDOZO L. REv. 861 (1997). Compare the discussion infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text 
regarding the elusiveness of a comprehensive regime to eliminate the underlying realization 
requirement itself. 
40. This simplifying assumption establishes the entire $wo,ooo proceeds as taxable amounts, 
easing the calculations. 
41. Any assumed change in value would demonstrate the principles so long as the Z and Y stocks 
experience the same value change. This is required to preserve the pretax equivalency. 
42. Accordingly, ignore a possible lower capital gains rate, which is considered infra notes 54-57 
and accompanying text. 
43. This leaves T with the same amount of risky investments regardless of the timing of the tax 
payment on the appreciation. This is required in order to maintain pretax equivalency. See supra Part 
I.A. 
66 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:55 
investment return.44 A more traditional explanation emphasizes T's 
ability to defer the tax on the 2004 accrued stock gain without any 
interest charge.45 
Given that the basic stock example above might suggest equal 
deferral potential for all,46 why is interest-free deferral until consumption 
so problematic? Consider fairness concerns first. Taxpayers in fact do not 
have equal deferral opportunities; such opportunities depend on the 
nature and amount of their income.47 Employees, for instance, typically 
must pay current tax on their wages even if saved for future 
consumption. In contrast, self-employed business owners might achieve 
interest-free deferral on their earned income by paying themselves a 
below-market salary.48 And as evidenced by Example 4 above, taxpayers 
generally have greater opportunities to defer investment income than 
earned income.49 The end result is that some taxpayers are subject to the 
income tax's burden on risk-free savings returns-e.g., the ordinary wage 
saver-while others receive the more favorable consumption tax 
treatment. 
Beyond fairness, interest-free deferral raises deep efficiency 
concerns that would exist even if deferral was equally available to all 
taxpayers. The realization income tax distorts owners' selling decisions. 
Interest-free deferral might induce an owner to retain an otherwise 
unwanted asset until consumption, as evidenced by Example 4 above. In 
addition, some sophisticated taxpayers transfer the ownership rights 
without actual title in hopes of avoiding the tough choice between higher 
taxes and unwanted assets. A classic example which worked until 
recently is the "short against the box" technique, under which taxpayers 
retain their own appreciated shares of stock while selling comparable 
shares borrowed from another stockholder.50 After a well-publicized case 
44. Once again, the $2,400 equals the 40% tax rate times the 10% risk-free return on the $6o,ooo 
of after-tax proceeds. 
45. E.g., Cynthia Blum, New Role for the Treasury: Charging Interest ·on Tax Deferral Loans, 25 
HARV. J . ON LEGIS. 1 (1988). Under this alternate explanation, T benefits in an amount equal to the 
product of the deferred $40,000 liability and the 6% (after-tax) interest rate. $40,000 x 6% = $2,400. 
46. In other words, all taxpayers have the ability to defer their taxes by avoiding realization until 
consumption. 
47. In particular, the wealthy have greater avoidance opportunities. See infra note 61 and 
accompanying text. Separately, the disparate tax results can distort behavior, thereby implicating 
efficiency concerns. 
48. This can be done without any economic loss to the owner/employee because the below-
market salary increases the value of the stock. For a more detailed example, see Engler, supra note 7, 
at 1211-12. Sophisticated taxpayers also might defer taxes on wages through a two-step approach: (1) 
first convert wages to capital gains through leveraged investments, and then (2) use capital losses to 
offset the capital gains. See Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax Code, 48 TAX L. REY. 537,646 (1993) . 
49. Similar to the wage context, deferring realization of investment income provides a benefit 
equal to the tax rate times the risk-free return on the after-tax investment income. 
50. The shareholder effectively locks in the stock gain through this technique because any 
subsequent losses on the retained shares will be matched by a gain on the short sale. 
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involving the prominent Lauder family,5' Congress finally responded with 
section 1259 of the Internal Revenue Code which requires gain 
recognition upon a "constructive sale of an appreciated financial 
position." While section 1259 clearly shut down the short against the box 
by specifying it as a "constructive sale,"52 the underlying problem remains 
as more sophisticated approaches are taken in response to the statute 
and the provision's limited scope.53 
Distorted selling decisions also contribute to the second category of 
realization problems, relating to the lower tax rate for gains on the sale 
of a capital asset. Such capital gains preference appeals under the income 
tax to reduce "tax lock-in": i.e., the tax bias favoring retention of 
appreciated assets.54 Similar to the deferral analysis above, however, a 
different rate for such gains raises equity and efficiency concerns. The 
problems go beyond the lower tax paid by those who realize true capital 
gains. First, the tax system has difficulty separating the earned income 
component from true investment gain in certain areas such as a patent 
development. Accordingly, ordinary wages generally will be subject to 
ordinary rates while other labor returns will qualify for the capital gains 
rate.55 The broader problem, however, tracks the above deferral analysis. 
The significant tax rate difference encourages sophisticated taxpayers to 
"convert" ordinary-rate income into long-term capital gains.56 Once 
again, the government has responded with a complicated anti-avoidance 
provision that leaves intact the underlying problem.57 
Tax losses are the third area of vulnerability under the realization 
51. Lee Sheppard, Fixes to Ensure That Tax ls Paid on Capital Gains, TAX NOTES, Dec. 5, 1995, 
available at LEXIS 1995 TNT 236-5 (The "Lauder family recently dodged more than $100 million of 
tax when they cashed out of some of their holdings using a short sale against the box."). 
52. I.RC.§ 1259(a)(1), (c)(1)(A) (2000). 
53. More sophisticated techniques on appreciated stock involve puts and calls. In such cases, the 
application of section 1259 turns on whether the taxpayer transferred substantially all the benefits and 
burdens of ownership. See David Schizer, Hedging Under Section 1259, TAX NoTEs, July 20, 1998, 
available at LEXIS 1998 TNT 138-91. 
54. Taxes might encourage individuals to retain assets they would otherwise sell (i.e., in the 
absence of any tax liability upon sale). Such tax-distorted retention deprives the government of any 
current tax collections on the gain and also leads to efficiency concerns as transfers to more efficient 
users might not materialize. For literature analyzing the potential benefits of a reduced rate for gains, 
see, e.g., Noel Cunningham & Deborah Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains Preference, 48 TAX L. 
REv. 319 ( 1993). 
55. See I.RC.§ 1235 ("A transfer of . . . all substantial rights to a patent ... by any holder shall be 
considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 1 year ... . "). 
56. This involves converting wages to investment return. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Big 
Accounting Firm 's Tax Plans Help the Wealthy Conceal Income, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2002, at AI 
(noting wage conversion); Shuldiner, supra note 48. While the tax code has anti-avoidance provisions, 
they are under-inclusive and add complexity. See infra note 6o. 
57. For remaining avoidance possibilities, see, e.g. , Shuldiner, supra note 48. For attempted 
statutory protections, see, e.g., I.RC. §§ 1258 (recharacterizing gain from certain financial transactions 
as ordinary income), 163 (limits on interest deductions). 
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income tax. Investment losses generally should be deductible under an 
income tax because they reduce overall net income.58 The problem under 
a realization income tax is that taxpayers control which assets they sell 
each year. Taxpayers therefore can "realize" a tax loss absent a true 
economic loss by selling loss assets while retaining appreciated assets. 
This allows further interest-free deferral, possibly even beyond the 
consumption date.59 Congress again attempts to police the area with anti-
avoidance provisions, which add complexity without solving the 
problem.6o 
In sum, the realization income tax's interest-free deferral and 
preferential capital gains rate raise serious equity concerns given the lack 
of equal availability to all taxpayers. The wealthy in particular have 
greater access to such beneficial aspects of current law.61 Efficiency 
concerns similarly abound given the interest-free deferral distortions. As 
an aside, an income tax in theory could correct these shortcomings by 
dropping the realization doctrine and taxing economic income as it 
accrues each year.62 A number of practical issues block such an 
"accretion" income tax, however, most notably administrative and 
58. See supra note 26. 
59. Consider again Example 4. T deferred the tax on the appreciated Z stock under the 
realization income tax until consumption by holding the stock until 2005. T might benefit from even 
longer interest-free deferral under the realization income tax if T held other investments, at least one 
of which has gone down in value. By selectively selling the loss asset(s) in addition to the Z stock (and 
reinvesting the proceeds), further interest-free deferral results if such losses can offset the taxable Z 
stock gain. While government has provided anti-avoidance provisions, sophisticated taxpayers often 
dodge such obstacles. See infra note 6o. 
6o. Consider first the more straightforward I.RC.§ 12n(b). This section attempts to protect the 
earned income tax base from the selective loss problem by allowing capital losses to offset only capital 
gains plus a de minimis amount of ordinary income ($3,000). Sophisticated taxpayers skirt the 
limitation by converting earned income to capital gain. See supra note 56. The provision also does not 
block deductibility against capital gain proceeds which fund consumption. In the other direction, the 
provision is over-inclusive. Consider for example a taxpayer with $100,000 of earned income who sells 
his one investment for a $100,000 loss. The taxpayer must pay tax on virtually all the earned income 
despite the lack of any true net income. See, e.g., Robert H. Scarborough, Risk, Diversification and the 
Design of Loss Limitations Under a Realization-Based Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REv. 677 (1993). 
More complicated protective provisions include the I.RC. section 1092 straddle rules. This 
provision defers realized losses where the taxpayer holds "offsetting positions" with unrealized gains 
which "substantially diminish" the taxpayers risk of loss. I.RC § 1092(c)(2)(A). Taxpayers might 
avoid the straddle rules, though, by investing in comparable companies. See Daniel Shaviro, Risk-
Based Rules and the Taxation of Capital Income, 50 TAX L. REV. 643, 665-68 (1995). 
61. See David Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on Tax Planning, 101 CoLUM. L. REV. 1312, 1315 
(2001) (government's narrow avoidance provisions have not increased the burden on wealthy 
taxpayers, who "sidestep" the provisions); Stephen Joyce, TIGTA Applauds IRS Compliance Scheme, 
Urges Better Measurement of Case Closures, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Nov. 29, 2004, at G-4 (A 
government audit stated that the "increase in taxpayers earning more than $100,000 annually 
introduced possibilities of non-compliance because those taxpayers possess the means to engage in 
tax-avoidance strategies."). 
62. This approach would increase (decrease) the tax base by the net increase (decrease) in value 
of the taxpayer's assets each year. 
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liquidity concerns.63 Accordingly, the realization problems continue to 
fester after all these years, reinforcing a leading commentator's 
characterization years ago of the realization requirement as the "Achilles 
heel of the whole comprehensive income tax ideal. "64 
2. Consumption Tax Addresses Realization Problems 
The consumption tax corrects all three problematic areas under the 
realization income tax.65 First, the consumption tax eliminates the tax 
incentive to retain appreciated assets until consumption because asset 
sales for reinvestment generally would not trigger tax.66 Thus, T would 
have the same after-tax consumption in Example 4 supra regardless of 
whether he sold or held the Z stock on December 31, 2004.117 As a related 
matter, because tax lock-in would no longer justify the capital gains 
preference, the complicated capital gains regime could, and should, be 
eliminated under the consumption tax.68 Finally, the consumption tax 
eliminates the tax loss problem because asset sales, even at a loss, would 
not reduce the consumption tax base.69 
C. SUMMATION OF CONSUMPTION TAXATION CASE 
The consumption tax corrects the interest-free deferral difficulties 
under the realization income tax. A consumption tax would raise 
potentially significant offsets if, as is sometimes assumed, the 
consumption tax exempted all investment return relative to a loophole-
free income tax. The consumption tax comparatively exempts only the 
low risk-free return, however, thereby significantly minimizing potential 
63. See Zelinsky, supra note 39, at 893-901 ( describing elusiveness of accretion system and adding 
public acceptance as another stumbling block). 
64. William D. Andrews, The Achilles Heel of the Comprehensive Income Tax, in NEw 
DIRECTIONS IN FEDERAL TAX POLICY FOR THE 1980s, at 278, 280-85 (Charles E. Walker & Mark 
Bloomfield eds., 1983). 
65. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 6; Chris Edwards, A Primer on Replacing the Corporate 
Income Tax with a Cash-Flow Tax, TAX NOTES, Sept. 8, 2003, available at LEXIS 2003 TNT 174-19. 
66. A limited exception exists for purchases of consumer durables (e.g. , cars or homes). Such 
purchases likely would face current tax, notwithstanding an investment element. For a deeper 
discussion of consumer durables, see Engler & Knoll, supra note 6. 
67. T's after-tax consumption would equal $322,400 regardless of whether T sold the Z stock for 
reinvestment on December 31 , 2004. Even if T sold in 2004, T could retain his $40,000 Treasury Note 
investment because he would owe no tax in 2004. This ignores non-tax transaction costs, e.g. , broker 
fees, which are independent of the tax regime. 
68. The lock-in justification is generally regarded as the leading justification for the preference. 
E.g., Cunningham & Schenk, supra note 54. Note how the new view calls into question another 
purported rationale in favor of the preference-reducing the tax burden on risky returns. The new 
view suggests that an income tax does not burden most risky returns. See supra note 35; infra note 109. 
69. As discussed supra note 29 and accompanying text, the government shares true economic 
losses under the consumption tax. Importantly, though, selective sales of loss assets do not reduce the 
consumption tax base. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 6, at 76 n.107 (discussing an alternate escape 
possibility under the consumption tax involving borrowed funds) . As discussed therein, however, the 
consumption tax significantly narrows the exposed areas, and the consumption tax, unlike the income 
tax, automatically corrects for time value of money differences. 
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tradeoffs to the critical correction of the problematic interest-free 
deferral.7° Finally, the consumption tax provides sorely-needed 
simplification by eliminating the need for the current complicated 
provisions related to interest-free deferral, including the capital gains 
regime.7r 
II. PROBLEMS WITH "SINGULAR" CONSUMPTION TAXES 
The preceding Part demonstrated the significant advantages of 
replacing the income tax with a consumption tax. As with any tax law 
change, the resulting advantages must be balanced against offsetting 
detriments, including transition issues. This Part highlights the significant 
offsets under the single-element VAT and the cash flow consumption 
tax, which obstruct the shift to a consumption tax. 
A. THE TRADITIONAL VAT (AND RETAIL SALES TAX) 
The comparable retail sales tax and VAT tax businesses rather than 
individual consumers.72 Accordingly, tax rates would not vary based on 
the consumer's overall consumption level because the tax is based on the 
business's operations. Therefore, a VAT would eliminate the current 
progressive rate structure, under which individual tax rates increase as 
overall income rises. A VAT could impose varying rates on different 
goods, e.g., high rates on "luxury" items and low rates on "necessities." 
This fails to achieve reliable progressivity, however, as many goods are 
consumed by individuals at different wealth levels.73 In sum, the lack of 
individualized progressive rates has raised serious and persistent 
distributional objections.74 Other issues raised by the VA T's business-
70. As discussed supra note 12 and accompanying text, exempting the risk-free return might have 
substantive appeal as a way to boost national savings. That is, in addition to yielding a relatively minor 
component of the tax base, such relinquishment might even be desirable in its own right. 
71. As discussed supra note 54 and accompanying text, the capital gains relates to interest-free 
deferral because tax lock-in provides the primary support for the preference. Administrative issues 
will be discussed in greater detail infra Parts IV.B.1 and V. 
72. The key difference between the two taxes regards the manner of collection. The VAT collects 
the tax on the value added at each level of production. The retail sales tax is imposed on the full retail 
sales price. The multi-stage VAT is generally viewed as a better check against noncompliance. See 
Alan Schenk, The Plethora of Consumption Tax Proposals, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1281 (19¢). 
73. Varying rates also distort consumer choices by providing a tax incentive to consume more 
"necessities" and fewer "luxury" goods. 
74. For instance, even leading proponents of a "flat-rate" tax modified the stand-alone VAT to 
allow some individualized rate variance. See Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax: A 
Simple Progressive Consumption Tax , in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 27 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1995) 
(separating out compensation in order to exempt salary of low wage earners); see also Allison Bennet, 
Bush Soon to Appoint Tax Reform Panel, Committed to Real Change, Bodman Says, DAILY TAX 
REPORT (BNA), Nov. 19, 2004, at G-8 (Deputy Treasury Secretary Samuel Bodman says the "president 
wants the tax system to be fair, stressing that 'progressivist is one attribute that is fundamental to 
fairness in taxation"'); Brett Ferguson, Social Security-Related Tax Reforms "Off the Table," Panel 
Chairman Mack Says , DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Jan. 31, 2005, at G-8 (Chairman Mack of the 
Whitehouse-appointed tax reform panel says the panel "will be sensitive to progressivity"); Nancy 
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level tax will be reserved for later Parts.75 
B. CASH FLOW CONSUMPTION TAX 
As discussed above, the cash flow tax would convert the current 
system to a consumption tax by making two primary changes: ( 1) an 
unlimited deduction for savings, and (2) the inclusion of all savings 
withdrawals for consumption. In marked contrast to current law, 
taxpayers would not pay any tax on saved wages until withdrawn for 
consumption. 76 This delayed tax collection on all saved wages implicates 
several contentious issues which hinder acceptance of the cash flow tax. 
Consider first two interrelated transition issues. Absent special rules, 
savings held at transition could be taxed twice. Assume T earns $100,000 
under a 40% income tax. T pays $40,000 tax on receipt, saving the other 
$60,000 for future consumption. T withdraws the $60,000 for 
consumption after adoption of a 40% cash flow tax. Under the normal 
cash flow rules, T would owe another $24,000 tax upon such withdrawal. 
A special cash flow exemption for previously-taxed savings withdrawals 
would address the double taxation. Such transition relief would cause a 
significant revenue loss in the early years after the shift, however, 
because both newly-saved wages and significant savings withdrawals 
would be tax exempt.77 
Ognanovich, Bush Says He Will Begin Difficult Effort To Change Tax, Social Security Structures, 
DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Nov. 5, 2004, at GG-1 (Bush acknowledges the need for Democratic 
support for his tax reform agenda); Katherine Stimmel, House Democrats Say They Back Tax Reform 
But Not Efforts Toward National Sales Tax, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Nov. IO, 2004, at G-5 
(Democratic representative James Clyburn favors tax reform but not the "establishment of regressive 
tax programs," like a national sales tax) . A VAT also could achieve progressivity through rebates to 
less wealthy taxpayers, but this requires a separate determination of every taxpayer's wealth. Cf 
Laurence Seidman, A Progressive Value Added Tax: Has its Time Finally Come?, TAX NOTES, June 7, 
2004, at 1255, available at LEXIS 2004 TNT I rn-33 (proposing a low-rate VAT as a supplement to the 
current income tax, with rebates based on levels of reported income). 
75. See infra Part IV.B. Analyzing such other issues is not necessary at this point because lack of 
progressivity is enough by itself to reject the stand-alone VAT. 
76. Under current law's qualified retirement plan treatment, taxpayers can avoid some tax on 
saved wages. This treatment has significant limitations, however, including ( 1) ceilings on the amount 
of saved wages, and (2) prohibitions on use of the savings. 
77. The problem is that either the income tax or the cash flow tax by itself generally provides a 
relatively steady tax flow from savers and dissavers, i.e., those who consume from their savings. The 
income tax collects from savers while the cash flow tax collects from dissavers. In response to the 
double tax problem discussed above, assume that after the shift dissavers may consume previously-
taxed savings without the usual cash flow tax. The cash flow tax would not collect tax on any new 
savings-under its regular rules for savings-or any dissavers owning wealth at transition-under the 
special transition relief. While the problem dissipates over time as dissavers consume their transition 
wealth, there could be a real decline in tax revenues for some time period. Politics impedes enhanced 
government borrowing in the interim period as a possible solution. See, e.g. Louis Kaplow, Recovery of 
Pre-enactment Basis Under a Consumption Tax, TAX NOTES, Aug. 28, 1995, available at LEXIS 1995 
TNT 171-47. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see Engler & Knoll, supra note 6; Engler, 
supra note 7. 
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The cash flow tax also raises more permanent concerns that 
taxpayers might not pay the delayed tax on saved wages.78 Tax currently 
is imposed on saved wages as paid, reinforced by a withholding 
obligation on the employer. The cash flow tax relinquishes tax at the 
original payment source, creating uncertainty as to whether savers 
ultimately will pay the tax due on consumption. Commentators have 
voiced concerns that some individuals would never pay the delayed tax 
due to expatriation or other tax evasion and avoidance mechanisms. 79 
The cash flow tax also would shift significantly the imposition of the 
progressive rate structure. The amount of wages for the year largely 
determines the degree of progressivity under current law. Progressivity 
under the cash flow tax would be based instead on the yearly 
consumption level, thereby introducing significant new imprecision.Bo 
To summarize, the cash flow tax changes go well beyond the risk-
free exemption demonstrated in Part I above. These additional changes · 
are unfortunate because they trigger serious objections-yet they are 
unrelated to the consumption tax's loophole-closing virtue, which stems 
from the risk-free exemption. Is it possible, then, to develop a different 
consumption tax form which maintains the loophole-closing virtue 
without raising the cash flow tax objections? As demonstrated in the next 
Part, two innovative "dual" consumption taxes provide an affirmative 
response. 
III. SIMILAR APPEAL OF THE Two DUAL CONSUMPTION TAXES 
The preceding Part highlighted the objectionable tradeoffs of the 
singular VAT and cash flow consumption taxes. This Part demonstrates 
how the Hybrid Approach and the X-tax similarly avoid these 
unacceptable offsets while preserving the consumption tax's loophole-
closing virtue. As shown below, the trick is to decompose the 
consumption tax into multiple parts, consisting of a progressive wage tax 
and a supplementary tax on consumption less wages. Neither the X-tax 
nor the Hybrid Approach taxes consumption per se, as evidenced by 
78. The prior problem recedes over time as transition savings are consumed. 
79. E.g., Michael J . McIntyre, The Design of Tax Rules for the North American Free Trade 
Alliance, 49 TAX LAW REv. 769, 769 n.14 (1994). The expatriation concern arises, for instance, because 
an expatriate would be outside the United States at the time of consumption. For a more detailed 
discussion of these issues, see Engler & Knoll, supra note 6, at 64-65; Engler, supra note 7. 
So. This follows from the fact that the tax collection date on saved wages would shift from the 
wage date to the consumption date. Setting aside the delay in the tax collection, the concern involves 
the possible change in tax rates on the two dates. Even in the absence of legislative change to the rate 
structure, a different tax rate could result due to the progressive rate structure. For instance, a higher 
tax rate could apply under the cash flow tax if consumption is bunched together into a heavy 
consumption year ( e.g., the purchase of a home or transfers upon death to the extent wealth transfers 
were treated as consumption). See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash 
Flow Personal Income Tax , 88 HARV. L. REV. 931 (1975). For a more detailed discussion of these 
issues, see Engler & Knoll, supra note 6; Engler, supra note 7. 
November 2005] PROGRESSIVE CONSUMPTION TAXES 73 
their similar taxation of saved wages. Nonetheless, both approaches end 
up with the equivalent of a consumption tax via the workings of their 
supplementary tax on consumption less wages. Part III.A describes in 
greater detail the workings of the Hybrid Approach and the X-tax. Part 
111.B then highlights why the shared characteristics of these dual taxes 
avoid the problems of singular consumption taxes. 
A. THE Two DUAL CONSUMPTION TAXES 
I. The Hybrid Approach 
As demonstrated above, the consumption tax implicitly exempts 
from tax the risk-free return on previously-taxed wealth. Drawing upon 
this insight, the Hybrid Approach minimizes ancillary changes to current 
law by working an explicit risk-free exemption into the existing structure. 
The Hybrid Approach would continue to tax individuals' wages, even if 
saved, subject to current law's limited exception for qualified retirement 
savings (the wage tax component).81 Individuals also would be taxed on 
the excess of (1) savings withdrawals for consumption over (2) saved 
wages plus the risk-free return thereon (an adjusted cash flow 
component). Thus, similar to current law, individuals would be taxed on 
wages and investment return, and the system could maintain current 
deductions for home mortgage interest and charitable donations.82 
Unlike current law, the investment return tax would explicitly exempt 
the risk-free return and would be imposed only at consumption, and at 
the regular tax rate.83 
As a practical matter, new investments would be deductible against 
savings withdrawals, but not wages.84 Unusable new investment 
deductions-due to the wage limitation-would carry forward 
indefinitely with interest at the risk-free rate. The basic facts of Examples 
8r. Under current law, individuals do not face current tax on saved wages if invested in qualified 
retirement plans such as 4or(k) or 403(b) plans. For a more detailed discussion of qualified retirement 
accounts, see infra note I 63 and accompanying text. 
82. See Kurt Ritterpusch, Bush-Appointed Tax Reform Panel's Heads Meet with Treasury Staff; 
Experts Optimistic, DAILY TAX REPORT (BNA), Jan. 12, 2005, at G-n, G-12 ("Bush directed the [tax 
reform] panel to ... recognize 'the importance of homeownership and charity.' In previous statements, 
Bush has spoken in favor of preserving tax deductions for mortgage payments and charitable 
contributions."). 
83. The hybrid approach therefore maintains the consumption tax's response to the income tax's 
realization-based concerns. Compare discussion of the cash flow tax at Part LB. The combination of 
the risk-free return exemption and a possible home mortgage deduction could present tax arbitrage 
concerns if taxpayers purchased investment assets with qualified home mortgage indebtedness (this 
would result if taxpayers could deduct the full nominal interest amount while excluding a portion of 
the corresponding asset return). As discussed infra note 87, however, such concerns could be 
addressed through several possible adjustments. 
84. Home mortgage interest and charitable donations could be deducted against both wages and 
investment returns, as per current law. New investments would be deductible against both savings 
withdrawals and wages under the traditional cash flow tax. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
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IA and 3A in Part I will illustrate these practical workings and the 
Hybrid Approach's consumption tax equivalency. Recall that T earns a 
$100,000 salary in 2004, payable on 12/31/04. T saves the entire after-tax 
salary for consumption one year later, investing $60,000 in X stock which 
doubles in value. A flat 40% tax rate. applies and the risk-free rate is 
10%. T would pay $40,000 tax in 2004, just like under the income tax. 
When T sells the $60,000 X investment for $120,000 on 12/31/05, Twill 
owe tax because the proceeds will be used for consumption. The 40% tax 
applies to the excess of (1) the $120,000 proceeds less (2) the $60,000 
saved wages plus a $6,000 risk-free interest adjustment. After paying 
$2 I ,600 tax on such $54,000 excess, T can consume $98,400. 
This $98,400 figure matches the Example 3A results for the cash 
flow tax. These identical results demonstrate the consumption tax 
equivalency of the Hybrid Approach. Also consider a second key 
identity between the cash flow tax and the Hybrid Approach: asset sales 
for reinvestment would not impact the tax base.85 Thus, the Hybrid 
Approach similarly corrects the realization problems under the income 
tax. Retention of appreciated assets would no longer provide interest-
free deferral benefits, nor would the selective sale of loss assets. Once 
again, the capital gains preference could, and should, be eliminated. 
Finally, note how the Hybrid Approach would aggregate an 
individual's investments.86 For example, assume that T splits the $60,000 
after-tax wages on 12/31/04 into two $30,000 investments and that T sells 
only the first investment for consumption on 12/31/05 at an assumed 
$60,000 price. Despite the $30,000 investment profit, T would not yet pay 
tax because aggregate savings withdrawals for consumption ($60,000) 
would not yet exceed aggregate saved wages plus interest (the same 
$66,ooo as under the original example). Assuming no other savings, when 
T sells the second investment for consumption, T would owe tax on the 
sales proceeds less the $6,000 unused offset as of 12/31/05 ($66,000 -
$60,000) plus subsequent interest thereon.87 
85. Like the cash flow tax, there would be a limited exception for purchases of consumer 
durables. See supra note 66. 
86. Once again, there would be a limited exception for consumer durable assets. In addition, 
separate tracking for property transferred by gift might be desirable. As a check on intra-family 
transfers to reduce the tax rate, the top tax rate could be applied to gift recipients upon consumption 
of the gifted property. This could be achieved by a separate "basket" for gifted property. For use of 
the basketing approach under the income tax, see William Klein, Joseph Bankman & Daniel Shaviro, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION (13th ed. 2003). 
87. As discussed supra note 83, the combination of a home mortgage deduction and interest 
adjustments on the unused offset amounts could raise tax arbitrage concerns. There are several 
possible responses to the tax arbitrage concern. First, the unused offset account could be reduced by 
some or all of the taxpayer's qualifying home mortgage indebtedness. Alternatively, the interest 
deductions on (some) home mortgage indebtedness could be reduced by the risk-free interest rate. For 
a similar suggestion in the business context, see infra note 143. 
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2. The X-tax 
The X-tax would also tax individuals on wages. In addition, 
businesses would pay a VAT-like tax, modified to allow a wage 
deduction. The X-tax therefore differs from the Hybrid Approach, most 
obviously in that the non-wage tax is imposed on businesses, not 
individuals.88 Nonetheless, like the Hybrid Approach, the X-tax 
decomposes the consumption tax into (1) an individual wage tax, and (2) 
an additional tax on consumption less wages. Another key similarity is 
that the X-tax uses risk-free interest adjustments to achieve timing 
neutrality when business deductions are deferred to later years.1!9 
An illustration of the X-tax is complicated by the uncertainty over 
who ultimately bears its burden-Le., its economic incidence.90 Consider 
first the business portion of the X-tax. Individuals bear taxes, not 
businesses.91 Well, then, which individuals would bear the X-tax paid by 
businesses? Several possible alternatives highlight the uncertain 
incidence. Business owners would bear the tax to the extent it reduces 
after-tax profits. But business owners might be able to pass on the tax to 
others, such as consumers through higher prices. A tax on wages also 
raises uncertainty over its economic incidence. While the legal obligation 
falls on the employee,92 the tax also could be passed on to consumers if 
pretax wages increase in response to the separate wage tax, and such 
higher business costs lead to higher consumer prices.93 
Assume first that the X-tax is borne by consumers.94 The X-tax 
results would then track the cash flow tax examples above because the X-
88. See infra Part IV for other differences in the supplemental taxes under the X-tax and Hybrid 
Approach. 
89. This could result where the business's investments in a given year exceed its taxable receipts. 
See discussion infra note 98 and accompanying text. Accordingly, like the Hybrid Approach, the X-tax 
makes more explicit the individual cash flow tax's implicit risk-free exemption. 
90. It is generally assumed that consumers bear a VAT as they consume. The X-tax might call 
into question such assumption due to its decomposition of the consumption tax into a fixed-rate 
business tax on consumption less wages and a progressive wage tax. In addition, some commentators 
question whether consumers bear the full conventional VAT. See infra notes 94, g6. 
91. But see infra note 109 (regarding taxes as the government's co-investment share). 
92. This is true even where employers have a withholding obligation on wages, as under current 
law. See I.RC. § 3402. Employers withhold on behalf of their employees, who retain the primary tax 
liability. 
93. The appropriate comparison is to a system which does not tax individuals on their wages, such 
as a conventional VAT. 
94. This is consistent with the classic assumption for broad-based consumption taxes. See, e.g., 
Henry Aaron, The Differential Price Effects of a Value-Added Tax, 21 NAT'L TAX J. 162, 167 (under 
classic assumptions, the consumption tax is fully shifted to consumers); Michael Graetz, International 
Aspects of Fundamental Tax Restructuring: Practice or Principle, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1093 (1997) 
(GAIT rules effectively assume VATs are borne by consumers). But see infra note g6. If consumers 
bear the business tax under the X-tax, consistent with the classic assumption for the traditional VAT 
which does not separate out the wage component, consumers presumably also bear the X-tax's wage 
portion. 
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tax would then fall on the act of consumption.95 As such, the X-tax 
corrects the realization problems, much like the cash flow tax. 
Given the significant uncertainty over the economic incidence, an 
alternate assumption would assume that laborers bear the wage portion 
and business owners bear the business portion.96 Assume again that T 
receives a $rno,ooo wage on 12/31/04. In order to emphasize certain X-
tax provisions, however, now assume that T invests his after-tax salary in 
a new wholly-owned business. Like the Hybrid Approach, T owes 
$40,000 tax on the $100,000 wages in 2004, leaving $60,000 for investment 
in the business on 12/31/04.97 The business purchases $60,000 inputs on 
12/31/04. While such inputs generate deductions under the X-tax, the 
deductions here must be carried forward to 2005 because the business 
has no taxable receipts to offset in 2004. As mentioned above, the 
deduction carryforwards get increased by the risk-free interest rate.98 
Assume the business sells all its assets/products for $120,000 one year 
later. Like the Hybrid Approach calculations above, the business would 
owe 40% multiplied by $54,000 (the excess of the $120,000 receipts over 
the $66,ooo interest-adjusted deduction). After paying $21,600 tax, T 
once again has $98,400 available for consumption.99 
95. Recall Example 3A, where T invested $6o,ooo of his wages in the risky stock and $40,000 in 
the Treasury Note. Although T must pay tax on his wages under the X-tax, his pretax wages would be 
grossed up to $166,667 under the assumption that economic incidence falls on the consumption act. If 
so, T still has $100,000 to invest after paying the 40% wage tax. Once again, T invests $6o,ooo in the 
risky stock and $40,000 in the Treasury Note, generating $r64,ooo before he consumes. This amount 
allows T to purchase only $98,400 of goods; that amount of goods must be sold for $r64,ooo to cover 
the tax ($r64,ooo x 40% equals $65,6oo of tax). 
¢ . Some commentators question whether consumers in fact bear the entire VAT. E.g., Cliff 
Massa & David Raboy, The Canadian Value-Added Tax: Does Anybody Care? , TAX NoTEs INT'L, Oct. 
25, 1989, available at LEXIS 1989 TNI 43-58. Beyond the traditional VAT, the X-tax might introduce 
additional uncertainty due to its separation of the wage component, taxed at an individualized 
progressive rate. Other permutations for the ultimate incidence are possible as well, of course. 
97. As an aside, T's employer would not owe business tax on this salary payment even if it is 
funded from taxable receipts (e.g., product sales) because T 's salary is deductible by the employer. 
This is in contrast to the traditional VAT, under which the compensation tax would be paid at the 
business level. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
98. Business deductions could also be carried forward, with interest, under Professor Bradford's 
suggestion that new expenditures should be spread out over time even where the business has 
otherwise taxable receipts. See Shaviro, supra note 36. For an alternate path to same result if the 
deductions can be currently used , see infra note 99. 
99. For ease of exposition, the example assumed the business could not currently use the 
deduction from its new purchase funded by T's contribution. Relaxing this assumption would leave T 
in the same general place, although the explanation is more complicated. If the business in which T 
invests saves current tax from T's investment, T need invest only $36,000. This results because a 
$6o,ooo business investment requires only $36,000 of outside capital if the new investment currently 
saves $24,000 of tax (40% x $6o,ooo). Therefore assume that T invests $36,000 in the business with the 
remaining $24,000 of after-tax wages in Treasury notes. The business would owe $48,000 tax upon the 
sale of all assets for $120,000 the next year. There would be no offsetting deduction now because it was 
already utilized in earlier year. This leaves a $72,000 distribution to T. Because T receives $26,400 
from the Treasury notes ($24,000 plus $2,400 interest) , T consumes the same $98,400 as under the 
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B. DUAL TAXES ADDRESS SINGULAR CONSUMPTION TAX PROBLEMS 
Part III.A showed how the Hybrid Approach and X-tax correct the 
income tax's realization problems, similar to the conventional VAT and 
cash flow tax.")() This Part 111.B highlights why the dual taxes' shared 
characteristics also address objections to the singular VAT and cash flow 
tax. Recall first the serious distributional objections to the business-level 
VAT. In favorable contrast, both the X-tax and the Hybrid Approach tax 
wages at progressive individualized rates. IO' 
Consider next the cash flow tax concerns stemming from its 
relinquishment of current tax on all saved wages. The dual taxes respond 
by maintaining an individual wage tax on saved wages. !02 First, an 
exemption for transition savings withdrawals would not trigger the same 
interim revenue concerns because tax still would be collected on new 
savings. Second, the up-front tax collections at the wage date and source 
address concerns that wage savers ultimately would avoid the deferred 
tax due at consumption. Finally, progressivity on saved wages would be 
based on yearly wages rather than yearly consumption, like current 
law.'03 
Finally, compare another possible consumption tax equivalent to 
emphasize the merits of the dual taxes' supplementary tax on 
consumption less wages. The basic facts of Examples IA and 3A 
illustrate the possible consumption tax equivalence of a single-element 
wage tax, with an explicit exemption for all investment return. 104 Under a 
flat 40% wage tax, T again would pay $40,000 tax on the $100,000 wages 
in 2004. In this case, however, T should limit his risky X stock investment 
to $36,000 (60% of $60,000) because the government no longer shares in 
40% of the profits and losses. 105 If T invested the other $24,000 in a IO% 
Treasury Note, T again could consume $98,400 after one year: $26,400 
other consumption taxes. 
100. See, e.g., supra note 83. 
101. As discussed infra Part IV, the Hybrid Approach also could impose progressive rates through 
its supplemental individual tax on consumption less wages. 
102. As discussed infra note 163 and accompanying text, the current rules providing special 
treatment for qualified retirement plans could be maintained under the Hybrid Approach. 
103. As discussed infra Part IV, the two dual consumption tax forms differ in some regards as to 
their response to the cash flow tax concerns. Consider progressivity, for example. The investment 
return component of the Hybrid Approach takes an individualized approach, based on the individual 's 
consumption level when savings are withdrawn. The X-tax's investment return component would also 
be imposed at the highest individual rate. Nonetheless, viewed generally, the first shared feature of the 
two dual consumption tax forms-the current tax on saved wages-addresses the cash flow tax 
concerns. 
104. See Warren, supra note So, at 936--41 (discussing the possible equivalency of the wage and 
consumption taxes, and the shortcomings of a stand-alone wage tax). 
105. T invested $6o,ooo in the risky stock under the income and cash flow taxes only because the 
government's 40% tax on investment returns in effect limited T to a 6o% partnership share. 
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Treasury Note proceeds plus $72,000 X stock proceeds. ",6 
Although the singular wage tax addresses the VAT and cash flow 
concerns like the X-tax and Hybrid Approach, it places tremendous 
pressure on distinguishing "wages" from "investment return." 107 In 
favorable contrast, both dual consumption taxes provide back-stop 
protection against such conversions through their supplemental tax on 
consumption less wages. roS The stand-alone wage tax raises other issues 
even if one assumes, as suggested by the core example analysis above, 
that tax collections on typical risky investment returns do not ultimately 
burden taxpayers. 109 Limiting tax collections to wages might raise 
offsetting revenue concerns or a perception problem that the wealthy pay 
no tax on their primary revenue source. 110 In addition, tax collections 
might actually burden risky returns for a number of reasons. 111 Once 
ro6. The $98,400 matches the results under the cash flow tax in Example 3A and the Hybrid 
Approach discussed supra Part III.A.I. 
107. While provisions like the capital gains rate make this distinction important under current law, 
see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text, the singular wage tax would raise the stakes even higher 
through its complete exemption for investment return. 
Consider the following example. T invests $Ioo,ooo of capital in a new business and performs 
$100,000 of services for such business. T sells the business for $300,000 to fund consumption. Half of 
the $200,000 increased value reflects the services and should be taxed under a wage tax. T might avoid 
such wage tax unless the business pays T the full $100,000 in salary, however. At the extreme, the 
business might not pay T any compensation (from a non-tax perspective, T qua laborer does not need 
to receive a salary because any unpaid salary redounds to him qua business owner). T might treat the 
entire $200,000 gain as exempt investment return. While the government could challenge the lack of 
salary, this requires enforcement resources and the ability to determine the true labor component in 
the absence of a market transaction. This difficulty in separating out the true labor amount arises in 
other contexts, such as patents. See David A. Weisbach, Ironing Out the Flat Tax , 52 STAN. L. REV. 599, 
6<>8--09(2000). 
ro8. Recall the example supra note 107. As discussed in that note, T might avoid all tax by treating 
the $100,000 earned income value as exempt investment return. If T treated the earned income value 
as investment return under either of the dual consumption taxes, the tax would not be avoided. If the 
wages were paid, T would pay tax on $100,000 of wages under either dual tax; the true investment 
return in excess of the risk-free rate ( e.g., $90,000, assuming a 10% risk-free rate) also would be taxed. 
While treating the earned income value as investment return would avoid the wage tax component, 
the taxable investment return under either dual tax would increase from $90,000 to $190,000. 
109. The possible wage tax equivalency suggests that the consumption tax, in particular, fails to 
burden all investment return, including the risky portion. If this is correct, Part I.A indicates that the 
income tax also exempts risky returns. This can be seen in two ways. First, as shown supra Part I.A, the 
primary difference between the income and consumption taxes concerns the risk-free rate. Second, the 
reason for the apparent lack of burden under the consumption tax is that taxpayers can offset the 
government's forced partnership on risky returns by increasing their risky investments. Under certain 
assumptions, this negates the tax burden, despite the formal tax payment. As discussed supra Part I.A, 
taxpayers similarly can increase their investments under the income tax. See supra note 35. 
1 IO. This also could raise concerns over the lack of U.S. taxation on foreign investment in the U.S. 
See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
111. One such reason concerns special , limited inframarginal opportunities, which provide above-
market returns after adjustment for risk. Taxpayers cannot avoid the tax burden on inframarginal 
returns by increasing their investment amounts (the inframarginal investment, by definition, is 
limited). A change in tax rates provides a second possible reason; the wage tax equivalency above 
assumed constant tax rates. 
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again, the dual consumption tax equivalents favorably contrast as they 
collect tax on risky investment returns, much like current law. 
IV. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE X-TAX AND HYBRID APPROACH 
Part III demonstrated the significant overlap between the X-tax and 
the Hybrid Approach and how their shared characteristics correct key 
difficulties with the income and singular consumption taxes. The two 
dual consumption taxes contain important differences, however, amidst 
their significant overlap. This Part explores the key areas of divergence, 
identifying the relative advantages of each. Part IV.A highlights the X-
tax's administrative advantages over the Hybrid Approach, while Part 
IV.B identifies a number of ancillary X-tax changes that significantly 
increase transition and related costs. 
A. FURTHER X-TAX SIMPLIFICATION FROM THE BUSINESS TAX 
As discussed above, a consumption tax closes income tax loopholes 
and simplifies the law. 112 The X-tax provides even greater simplification, 
at least in one regard. Individuals would report only wages under the X-
tax; all other reporting aggregates at the business level. In contrast, 
individuals would be required to account for all investments under the 
original Hybrid Approach. 
In one sense, this distinction between business and individual 
reporting can be misleading. Similar accounting would be required of a 
small business owner under both the X-tax and the Hybrid Approach. 113 
A meaningful distinction nonetheless exists when considering, e.g., an 
"ordinary" individual who owns some stocks, bank deposits, and money-
market accounts. Such individual would need to track these investments, 
and apply the risk-free interest adjustment, under the original Hybrid 
Approach. In favorable contrast, the comparable interest adjustments 
under the X-tax would be aggregated and applied at the business level. 
Pushing such calculations to the business level might lessen 
administrative, or related public perception, objections to the new 
interest adjustments. ll4 
112. See supra Part 11.B. Consumption taxes eliminate significant areas of income tax complexity 
by neutralizing time value of money differences. This includes, but is not limited to, the elimination of 
the need for the capital gains preference. See also , e.g., supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text 
(discussing I.RC.§ 1259, regarding constructive sales). 
113. This assumes that the X-tax lacks a small business exemption. A small business exemption 
raises possible tax avoidance and other concerns. See Weisbach, supra note 1<Y7, at 645-47. 
II4. See Bankman, supra note 1, at 87 (taxpayers might have difficulty understanding the interest 
adjustments). Moving the interest adjustments to the entity level might address such concerns, at least 
in part. Individual taxpayers would not have to make such adjustments although they still would be 
part of the tax system. Offsetting elimination of complexity under the consumption tax should more 
than outweigh complexity concerns over the new interest deductions. 
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B. ADDITIONAL X-TAX TRANSITION COSTS 
Transition costs generally favor narrow over broad legal changes, 
ceteris paribus, as briefly evidenced above by the cash flow tax 
difficulties. And the second key-difference between the X-tax and the 
Hybrid Approach concerns the degree of change to current law. While 
both taxes provide the desired realization correction through a limited 
risk-free exemption, the X-tax also would make a number of ancillary 
fundamental changes to current law. This section first identifies such X-
tax changes, and then explores transition costs in greater detail. 
I. Additional Fundamental Changes Under the X-tax 
Consider first the "corporate tax integration" under the X-tax. 
Under current law, corporate stock investments are taxed both at the 
corporate and shareholder levels. 115 The X-tax would "integrate" this 
current double tax regime into a single fixed-rate business tax. Next, and 
somewhat related, the X-tax would shift the current single tax on non-
corporate businesses from the individual owner level to the business 
level. 116 This significant shift would apply to all "tax partnerships," 
including many limited liability companies. In a third significant shift, the 
X-tax would exempt most "financial" transactions such as loans, earning 
its moniker as an "R-tax," imposed only on "real" transactions. 117 
The last two fundamental changes interrelate. Broadly, the X-tax 
shifts from a "receipts" focus to an "expenditure" focus. That is, the 
current system must police appropriate inclusions of taxable receipts 
(e.g., wages, investment returns, etc.). In contrast, the X-tax base relies 
on the proper reporting of taxable expenditures by individuals ( e.g., 
purchases of goods and services). 118 Finally, significant international 
changes would result regardless of whether the X-tax was imposed on an 
"origin" or "destination" basis. Consider first an "origin-basis" X-tax 
which would tax U.S. production rather than U.S. sales. In a significant 
change, there would not be any direct U.S. tax collections on imports 
consumed by U.S. individuals. 119 Contrast a "destination-basis" X-tax, 
u5, Currently, shareholders are subject to tax on dividends and gains on sale, I.RC, §§ 6r(a)(3), 
(7) (2005), even though corporations generally pay tax on their profits, id, § rr, 
u6. In addition, the X-tax would apply regardless of whether the business's interests are publicly 
traded. But compare I.RC. § 7704(a), which generally forces double taxation on non-corporate 
entities only if they are publicly traded, 
r 17. Avoidance concerns are at least partially responsible for making the tax "R-based." 
1 r8. The current system must monitor expenditures in determining allowable deductions. 
Nonetheless, the change is potentially important because the rule on inclusions differs. While the 
current system must regulate expenditures, the "default rule" is that expenditures are consumption 
(i.e. , taxpayers must claim deductions, which are subject to challenge). Under the expenditure focus of 
the X-tax, the system must specifically target inclusion of those expenditures that constitute taxable 
"consumption." Compare infra note 127 (discussing the new gap on deferred payment sales). 
u9. In contrast, U,S. individuals generally are subject to U.S. tax on consumption of foreign goods 
under the current (income) tax structure. This results because U.S. individuals generally must include 
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which would be imposed on U.S. sales rather than U.S. production. 
While imports would be subject to a direct U.S. tax, U.S. exports would 
receive a blanket U.S. tax exemption in an alternate shift. 120 
2 . Difficulties with X-tax's Ancillary Changes 
The additional X-tax changes would significantly increase transition 
costs. Consider first X-tax changes over the legal responsibility for the 
tax. As described above, partnerships would assume responsibility for 
federal taxes from the partners. Tax payments on loans similarly would 
shift from lenders to borrowers as the X-tax would eliminate interest 
deductions for borrowers and interest inclusions for lenders. 121 Changing 
the legal responsibility for the tax could create undesirable wealth shifts 
as existing partnership and loan agreements reflect the current tax 
treatment. For instance, the current tax treatment of loans-inclusion 
(deduction) of interest by lenders (borrowers)-results in higher interest 
rates, ceteris paribus. This reflects the parties' understanding that the 
after-tax interest rate is lower than the pretax interest rate. Lenders 
therefore could benefit at borrowers' expense on existing loans under the 
X-tax as the higher pretax rate would become the after-tax rate as well. 122 
their worldwide tax receipts as income. U.S. individuals arguably would bear an implicit tax on their 
consumption of foreign goods even under an origin-basis U.S. VAT. This argument relies on exchange 
rate adjustments to equalize origin and destination based taxes, at least in the long run. For example, if 
the United States exempted imports under an origin VAT, increased demand for foreign goods would 
weaken the dollar, thereby making foreign goods more expensive. See, e.g., Graetz, supra note 94, at 
no1--03. The import exemption nonetheless is likely to raise objections. See id. at no3 ("U.S. 
'manufacturers' that compete with products from abroad will not readily accept economists' 
assurances that exchange rates will adjust quickly and effectively."). In any event, the origin-basis 
VAT would be a significant change to current law, implicating the general concerns discussed infra 
Part IV.B.2. 
120. Current law is not typically contemplated in terms of an origin or destination basis because it 
is an income tax. The income tax nonetheless encompasses an origin-basis. Shaviro, supra note 36, at 
92. 
121. Currently, borrowers generally can deduct interest while creditors generally must report an 
offsetting inclusion. An R-based system would eliminate the borrower's deduction and the lender's 
inclusion. 
122. This is not a concern for new loans, because interest rates would adjust on a going-forward 
basis. There could be similar wealth shifts between partners. Consider, for instance, how the ancillary 
move to entity taxation might undercut desired transition relief for the more general shift from an 
income tax to a consumption tax. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 76-77, transition relief 
generally appeals in connection with the move to a consumption tax as a way to avoid an undesired 
double tax on transition savings. Suggested transition relief generally takes the form of allowing 
deductions for asset basis at the time of transition. Consistent with its entity approach, X-tax transition 
relief contemplates business transition deductions based on the business's basis. David Bradford, 
Consumption Taxes: Some Fundamental Transition Issues, in FRONTIERS OF TAX REFORM 123, 143 
(Michael J. Boskin ed., 1996). This might significantly distort the desired relief for non-corporate 
businesses, however. The X-tax approach would aggregate the relief at the entity level, allowing all 
entity participants to share in such relief on a pro rata basis. Yet, the participants generally should 
receive varying relief based on their basis in their ownership interests. Because shareholders also are 
taxed under current law, it might appear that the same is true in the corporate context. A 
distinguishing feature in the corporate context, though, is that there currently is an entity tax. In 
82 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 57:55 
Possible transition relief w<:>uld add complexity without eliminating 
the concerns. 123 Private drafting costs also would increase as parties 
would have to renegotiate arrangements in response to these significant 
changes. 124 A recent study by Professors Yin and Shakow neatly 
summarizes the collective transition concerns. After analyzing the 
related issue of possible improvements to partnership taxation under the 
income tax, Yin and Shakow recommended a modified individual-level 
tax over a new entity tax, citing "greater transitional costs" as "perhaps 
the deciding factor." 125 
The substantial X-tax changes also raise the level of uncertainty 
regarding the shift to a consumption tax. Possible exploitation after 
enactment is one aspect of the uncertainty difficulties. 126 As an example, 
overstating the interest element on a deferred payment sale would allow 
tax-free consumption under the X-tax. 127 Uncertainty difficulties from 
extensive changes may also impede enactment as policy makers must 
reach comfort on a wider range of issues. 128 The X-tax requires 
theory then, there should be both entity and individual relief. Because the corporate tax is the more 
prominent tax, entity tax relief might be a good compromise in the corporate context. 
123. As with any tax law change, the propriety of transition relief is open to some debate. For a 
general discussion of transition relief, compare, for example, Kyle D. Logue, Tax Transitions, 
Opportunistic Retroactivity, and the Benefits of Government Precommitment, 94 MICH. L. REV. u29 
(1996), with Michael J . Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 
126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 (1977). As to the specific issue regarding debt, Professor Bradford, the X-tax 
originator, concluded that it was a real concern worthy of possible transition relief. Bradford, supra 
note 122, at 143. While any consumption tax form raises a transition shift on debt due to the new risk-
free exemption, an R-type consumption tax exacerbates matters by extending the shift to the full 
interest return . 
124. See Michael Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REv. 789, 837-38 (2002) 
(stating that parties will "need to review and adjust internal forms and practices in response to a 
change in the law"). 
125. GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, TAXATION OF PRIVATE 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, REPORTERS' STUDY loo--01 (American Law Institute 1999). Specifically, they go 
on to explain that the individual "approach is already in effect for [tax partnerships). In contrast, an 
entity tax approach imposing only a single level of taxation on business income would represent a new 
system for all firms. " Id. at IOI. 
126. See Van Alstine, supra note 124, at 834-35 (" [U)ncertainty spawned by legal change ... will 
increase the likelihood of opportunistic argumentation at the margins of the law. "). 
127. This stems from the shift to an R-tax with expenditure focus. There would be a corresponding 
understatement of the real (taxable) purchase price. The problem arises from the loan exclusion under 
the R-based tax. While the government can challenge the interest component, this is an imperfect 
response. Manipulating the interest and purchase price components also presents issues under current 
law for certain taxpayers due to the capital gains rate and time value of money concerns. Nonetheless, 
this would add a significant new element: no tax collection to the extent of the disguised purchase 
price on consumption expenditures by all individual consumers. See Charles E . McLure Jr. & George 
R. Zodrow, A Hybrid Approach to the Direct Taxation of Consumption, in FRONTIERS OFT AX REFORM 
70, 76-77, 84 (Michael J . Boskin ed., 1996). 
128. See Nathanial 0 . Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy , 22 HARV. ENvrL. L. REV. 313, 358 (1998) (" [L]egislators may 
need to spend time learning about unfamiliar policy instruments before they can provide substantial 
support, thereby giving rise to a status quo bias in favor of the current regime . . .. "). 
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consideration of complex issues including corporate integration,129 
complete elimination of an individual investment return tax, 130 the 
partnership and loan tax collections shifts, and the U.S. exemption of 
either imports or exports. 131 Related thereto, recall the consumption tax's 
initial attraction as a simple correction to realization problems under the 
income tax. 132 
To summarize, then, this is not a policy argument against any 
particular X-tax change. 133 Rather, the enormity of the X-tax changes can 
overwhelm the process and trigger the status quo bias against substantial 
changes.134 In favorable contrast, the Hybrid Approach minimizes 
129. Corporate integration through a single corporate-level tax precludes the ability to vary the 
rate on corporate investors based on their particular profile. For one potential problem related to this 
standardization, see infra Part V.A.2, regarding foreign investors and treaty negotiations. In addition 
to the issues mentioned in the text, consider the possible shift in tax incidence from investors to 
consumers, as is commonly assumed under the X-tax. See supra notes 94, 96 (discussing tax incidence 
under the X-tax). 
130. Whether imagined or real, there might be discomfort in completely releasing the individual 
tax. Consider, for example, the following questions which might come to mind. Would there be a small 
business exception? Would an exemption for real estate businesses be problematic? See Weisbach, 
supra note 107, at 614 (noting such exemption for the structurally comparable flat tax). Back to the 
expenditure focus, would the tax encompass all consumption of goods/services? Furthermore, even if 
the substantive issues are adequately addressed, there might be a public perception problem. It might 
appear that the wealthy do not pay any tax on investment returns. 
131. See supra notes 119--20 and accompanying text. 
132. Current arguments for the consumption tax's superiority often emphasize the limited risk-free 
differential between the consumption and income taxes. See, e.g., supra Part I.A; Bradford, supra note 
122, at 12&-33; Shaviro, supra note 36. An income tax proponent might be swayed by this intellectually 
challenging, yet concentrated, argument. The X-tax consumption form, however, then forces the 
income tax proponent to navigate through a number of other significant changes, calling into question 
the limited nature of the differences between an income and a consumption tax. See, e.g., Julie Roin, 
The Consequences of Undoing the Federal Income Tax , 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 319, 334 (2003) ("This 
[e]ssay just begins to identify and evaluate the myriad dislocations and changes that would be brought 
about by (the] repeal" of the federal income tax and its replacement with a VAT.). 
133. Professor Bradford and others have provided outstanding analysis of the X-tax since its 
introduction in 1988. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 122; Shaviro, supra note 36, at 93-97; Weisbach 
supra note 6. The tremendous quantity of work in the intervening years highlights, though, the 
extensiveness of the X-tax changes, with the aforementioned difficulties. 
134. The status quo bias can be seen both on an individual basis and collectively under the 
legislative process. Lillian R. Be Vier, The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 
r994: A Surprising Sequel to the Break Up of AT&T, 51 STAN. L. REv. 1049, 1o62 n.37 (1999) ("The 
status quo bias exhibited by legislative institutions is in large part the sum of the biases of individual 
legislators."); Keohane et al., supra note 128, at 339--45; William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, 
Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 33 (explaining individuals' status quo 
bias as a combination of "(1) rational decision making in the presence of transition costs and/or 
uncertainty; (2) cognitive misperceptions; and (3) psychological commitment stemming from 
misperceived sunk costs, regret avoidance, or a drive for consistency."); Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Schechter Poultry at the Millenium: A Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 
1399, 1423 n.155 (2000) ("[T]he Framers anticipated that the Article I legislative process would 
promote stability and incremental change rather than sudden and significant departures from the 
status quo.") (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejon, The Article I, Section 7 Game, Bo GEO. 
L.J. 523, 532 (1992)). 
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transition concerns by incorporating the consumption tax's risk-free 
exemption into the existing tax structure.135 The Hybrid Approach 
focuses the legal change on the critical realization problems, long 
recognized as "the Achilles Heel of the Income Tax."136 Finally, this 
analysis suggests continuation of an entity-level tax on corporations, 
similarly converted to a consumption tax through a risk-free 
exemption. 137 Part V will explore corporate taxation in greater detail as it 
balances the respective strengths of the X-tax and the Hybrid Approach. 
V. REFORM PROPOSAL: A TRIPARTITE CONSUMPTION TAX 
Both the X-tax and the Hybrid Approach appeal due to their sorely-
needed correction to interest-free deferral under the realization income 
tax. Accordingly, both dual consumption taxes would strengthen the tax 
base while providing desired simplification through the elimination of 
the complicated capital gains regime and other intricate provisions which 
protect against interest-free deferral. The comparison of the X-tax and 
Hybrid Approach highlighted a difficult tradeoff, though. In one sense, 
the X-tax would further simplify the law by limiting individual taxation 
to wages. Such additional X-tax simplification carries a heavy transition 
toll, due to the totality of the X-tax changes. Rather than choosing 
between the two taxes, this Part endeavors to combine the X-tax's 
further simplification with the Hybrid Approach's transition ease. 
I propose a new tripartite consumption tax consisting of: (I) an 
individual wage tax, (2) a corporate business tax,138 and (3) a more 
limited individual tax on non-wages which exempts certain investments. 
135. See Alison Bennett, Bush Soon to Appoint Tax Reform Panel, Committed to Real Change, 
Bodman Says, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 19, 2004, at G-8 (Deputy Treasury Secretary "hinted the 
administration may be considering an incremental approach to reform"); Ralph Lindeman, Nine-
Member Panel on Tax Reform Created; Reactions, Warnings, Suggestions Abound, Daily Tax Rep. 
(BNA), Jan. IO, 2005, at GG-1 ("Lawmakers and tax analysts generally agree that major changes to 
the tax code will be difficult to achieve."); Katherine M. Stimmel, Thomas Says Lawmakers Must 
Balance Reform Goals Against What Can Be Passed, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Nov. 19, 2004, at G-12 
(House Ways and Means Chairman suggests that "incremental reforms rather than fundamental 
overhaul of the tax system has a better chance of getting enacted"); Van Alstine, supra note 124, at 
858 (" A sensitivity to legal transition costs could manifest itself in ... a systemic preference for 
targeted change over comprehensive reform. . . . [I]nitiating change carefully and within the 
framework of the existing legal regime can diminish substantially the likely transition costs."). 
136. Andrews, supra note 64, at 278. 
137. This would maintain the current double tax regime. Absent a corporate-level tax, the 
individual Hybrid Approach also would integrate the corporate tax, in this case through a single 
shareholder tax. See Engler & Knoll, supra note 6, at 6o-62 (suggesting the possibility of a corporate 
tax in connection with the Hybrid Approach). Note the lack of a capital gains preferential rate for 
corporations under current law. See I.RC. § 1201(a) (2005) (capping the corporate rate on capital 
gains at 35%, the same as the top ordinary rate under current law). 
138. While I also recommend a low-rate dividend tax on shareholders, I consider such tax as part 
of the corporate business tax for these purposes because such tax would be calculated and collected by 
corporations. See infra note 150 and accompanying text. 
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This blended approach harmonizes the relative strengths of the X-tax 
and the Hybrid Approach; it further simplifies individual taxation 
without heavy transition concerns. This Part first isolates corporate 
investments given their unique "double tax" treatment under current 
law: i.e., a high-rate corporate tax plus a low-rate shareholder tax on 
dividends and capital gains. 139 This Part then considers other investments 
which could be disregarded by the individual investment tax. 
A. CORPORA TE INVESTMENTS 
I . Corporate-level Consumption Tax 
The transition analysis above for partnerships reverses for 
corporations. As discussed above, entity taxation of partnerships would 
trigger significant transition costs as the full tax liability would shift from 
the partners to the partnership. The converse is true for corporations; 
elimination of the high-rate corporate tax would cause significant 
dislocations. Continued entity taxation of corporations therefore appeals 
under a consumption tax, especially given the administrative advantages 
of aggregated tax calculations and payments at the entity level. 140 
How should the current corporate tax be converted into a 
consumption tax? Drawing upon the individual taxpayer analysis above, 
there are two main possibilities. A cash flow approach would permit 
current-year deductions for business expenditures as spent, including the 
cost of assets with value beyond the current year, such as equipment. In 
contrast, current law requires capitalization of such long-lived assets, 
which defers deductions until later years through depreciation 
allowances. 14 1 This suggests the second consumption tax possibility: 
maintain depreciation of long-lived assets, but increase deferred costs by 
the risk-free interest rate. 142 This interest adjustment could be calculated 
139. The maximum rate on dividends and capital gains is 15%, I.RC. §§ 1(h)(1)(C), 1(h)(u) 
(2005), while the top corporate rate is 35%. Id. § u(b)(1)(D). 
140. If the corporate tax were eliminated, individual returns from the corporate enterprise 
presumably would then be taxed at the regular individual rates, similar to tax partnerships. Under a 
consumption tax, this could take the form of the individualized Hybrid Approach. Like current law, 
qualifying corporations could elect pass-through treatment under "Subchapter S." See I.RC. §§ 1361-
1379 (2005). Similar to above, these returns could be taxed as part of the individualized Hybrid 
Approach. 
141. Depreciation is not available on non-wasting assets like land. The cost of land is recovered 
only at disposition as an offset against sales proceeds. Separately, there are certain exceptions under 
current law to the capitalization requirement for assets with useful lives beyond the current year. E.g., 
I.RC.§ 179 (election to expense certain depreciable business assets). 
142. This still corrects the interest-free deferral under the realization income tax. See , e.g., 
Edwards, supra note 65, at 1296 (noting the timing-advantageous techniques under the corporate 
income tax such as deferring built-in asset gains and allocating acquisition costs to favorable assets in 
order to obtain quicker depreciation); see also Engler & Knoll, supra note 6, at 6o-62 (the 
consumption tax corrects the realization defects through its timing neutrality). Notwithstanding such 
timing neutrality, it might be desirable to accelerate some tax collections, either for current revenue 
purposes or due to possible concerns that the tax would be deferred indefinitely. If so, as discussed 
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separately for each asset143 or on an aggregate basis for all corporate 
assets. 144 
The cash flow approach would further simplify current law by 
eliminating depreciation calculations. 145 On the other hand, the 
capitalization with interest approach would smooth revenue and 
transitional concerns. 146 A middle-ground approach would extend cash 
flow treatment for some, but not all, assets that currently must be 
capitalized. 147 
2. Shareholder Dividend Tax 
In addition to the full-rate corporate tax, a low-rate shareholder tax 
could be imposed upon corporate distributions of the (risky) investment 
profits. This might ease revenue and transition concerns given the 
current low-rate shareholder tax on dividends. The international context 
further supports maintenance of a dividend tax. International reciprocity 
exists under current law as foreign countries tax U.S. investors on foreign 
dividends and the United States taxes foreign investors on U.S. 
dividends. Some commentators therefore counsel against a unilateral 
elimination by the U.S. of its tax on cross-border dividends, expressing 
concern over such issues as weakened treaty leverage in negotiating 
reciprocal dividend tax reductions. 148 
infra note 159, additional adjustments could be made to accelerate certain tax collections. 
143. Under this approach, loans also should be separately indexed by reducing the interest 
deductions (inclusions) to the borrower (lender) by the risk-free component. If not, taxpayers could 
engage in tax arbitrage by using borrowed proceeds to acquire assets. Absent debt indexation, 
taxpayers could deduct the full amount of nominal interest while excluding a portion of the 
corresponding asset return. A similar problem exists under current law due to the capital gains 
preference. Leveraged acquisitions provide tax arbitrage benefits where interest deductions offset 
ordinary income while the corresponding asset gain is taxed at capital gains rates. See discussion supra 
notes 56-57 and accompanying text. 
144. Under an aggregate approach, the corporation's aggregate basis in its assets should be 
reduced by its total debt. The interest adjustment would apply to the net calculation. The interest 
adjustment could be allowed annually as it accrues, or could be deferred. Any such deferred 
deductions should also accrue an interest increase to maintain time value of money neutrality. This is 
similar to the aggregation at the individual level under the original Hybrid Approach. See supra note 
87 and accompanying text. 
145. Interest calculations would still be needed as corporate deductions likely would be deferred if 
total deductions exceeded taxable inclusions in any year. See, e.g., supra note 98 and accompanying 
text. 
146. Importantly from an administrative standpoint, any depreciation-and now interest-
calculations would be centralized inside large corporations. 
147. As discussed supra note 141, some assets receive cash flow treatment even under current law. 
The compromise approach suggested here would increase the assets eligible for cash flow treatment, 
while still requiring capitalization/depreciation for certain assets. 
148. The new view addresses a separate concern that shifting to a corporate consumption tax 
would establish the United States as a tax haven for foreign investment. See Graetz, supra note 94, at 
1098-99. As discussed supra Part I.A, the new view highlights how the consumption tax comparatively 
exempts only the risk-free investment return, maintaining comparable treatment of risky returns. The 
consumption tax variant which explicitly exempts the risk-free return especially reinforces this key 
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Importantly, this "shareholder" tax should differ from the individual 
Hybrid Approach tax applicable to non-corporate investments.149 The tax 
should be imposed at a fixed low-rate on corporate distributions of risky 
investment returns. In addition to addressing the above revenue, 
transition, and international concerns, this limited shareholder tax could 
access the administrative advantages of entity taxation. Corporations 
would calculate the tax, and also could collect it through withholding, as 
is currently done for foreign shareholders. 150 
Further drawing upon current law, two international refinements 
merit further consideration. 15 1 Foreign shareholders could be subject to a 
higher fixed tax rate on U.S. dividends, subject to possible treaty 
reduction. 152 This would further address the treaty leverage concerns 
discussed above. Second, domestic shareholders could be subject to the 
regular-rate investment tax, not the low-rate dividend tax, on returns 
from certain foreign corporations. This would address concerns like 
limitation. In addition, the U.S. corporate income tax has occasionally provided equal- and possibly 
more favorable-treatment than a cash flow consumption tax due to the combination of accelerated 
depreciation plus an investment tax credit. See Harry Grubert & T. Scott Newlon, Reply to A vi-Yonah , 
49 NAT'L TAX J. 267 (1996); Weisbach, supra note 107, at 643. 
149. Application of the regular Hybrid Approach investment tax would (i) significantly increase 
the tax burden on corporate equity and (ii) eliminate the administrative advantages of corporate-level 
taxation. 
150. Cf Calvin Johnson, The Bush Administration: 35 Percent Flat Tax on Distributions from 
Public Corporations, TAX NOTES, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1881, 1881-82, 1890, available at LEXIS 2003 TNT 
57-24 (recommending that any tax on distributions be computed by and collected from the 
corporation itself and not from a million, amateur bookkeeper shareholders). If the corporate tax took 
the cash flow form, the taxable shareholder distributions amount generally should match the 
corporation's taxable amount for the year. One might ask, then, why not just collapse the corporate 
and shareholder taxes into a single corporate-level tax at a higher rate? The answer is that the separate 
shareholder component allows variation of the tax rate depending on the particular shareholder(s). 
For example, the shareholder tax can be reduced by treaty for certain foreign shareholders. See supra 
text accompanying note 148. This does suggest, though, a possible future elimination of the dividend 
tax in favor of a single corporate tax, possibly at a higher rate, if additional comfort is reached on the 
international treaty concerns. See infra note 159 ( discussing how a corporate consumption tax 
facilitates corporate integration). 
If the corporate tax rejected the cash flow approach in favor of depreciation with interest 
adjustments, the shareholder tax should apply to dividends to the extent of the corporation's "earnings 
and profits" account, like current law. Such earnings and profits account would naturally take into 
account the interest adjustments because earnings and profits are calculated by adjustments to the 
taxable amount. Increasing the undistributed earnings and profits by the risk-free rate would be a 
worthwhile adjustment as this would maintain timing neutrality over distribution decisions. Additional 
protection might be provided by a separate rule taxing shareholder distributions in excess of 
shareholder contributions plus the risk-free return thereon, appropriately reduced for prior 
distributions. 
151. The international analysis herein focuses on key broad-based applications. Additional 
international refinements might be appropriate as well, given the intricacies of international taxation. 
152. Under current law, U.S. shareholders face a top rate of 15% on dividends from U.S. 
corporations. I.RC. §§ 1(h)(1)(C), 1(h)(u) (2005) (dividends treated as capital gains for domestic 
shareholders). In comparison, foreign shareholders face a top rate of 30%. Id. § 871(a)(1)(A) (30% 
rate on non-resident alien individuals). 
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insufficient taxation on returns from foreign corporations in tax haven 
jurisdictions.153 
3. Elimination of Shareholder Tax on Stock Sale Gains 
Four reasons support my proposed elimination of the current 
shareholder tax on stock sale gains. 154 First, unlike the shareholder 
dividend tax, taxing stock sale gains would require individual calculations 
and payments, undercutting the administrative advantages of entity 
taxation. Second, eliminating the shareholder tax on stock sale gains 
would not disrupt the current international balance as the United States 
already exempts foreigners' stock sale gains. 155 Third, as a practical 
matter, individuals tend to grossly understate such gains under current 
law.'56 
Fourth, the stock sale tax protects against interest-free deferral 
under the corporate income tax, but the corporate consumption tax 
corrects for interest-free deferral on its own. Consider a corporation 
whose assets appreciate under the original group of stock owners. These 
stockholders can cash out on their investment without triggering the 
corporate-level tax by selling their stock. The unrealized gains remain 
intact at the corporate level under the new ownership group, but such 
153. Under current law, U.S. shareholders receive the capital gains rate only on dividends from 
domestic corporations and qualified foreign corporations. I.RC. § 1(h)(11)(B)(i) (2005). Qualified 
foreign corporations include corporations eligible for treaty benefits under a treaty deemed 
satisfactory by the Treasury Secretary. Id. § 1(h)(11)(c)(i)(II). The U.S.-Barbados treaty was deemed 
insufficient for this purpose because it provided double-tax relief benefits to corporations not subject 
to double taxation. STAFF OF CONF. COMM., J. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONF., ro8TH 
CONG. 29 (2003) (Conference Committee report on H.R 2, "The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003"). Returns from non-qualified foreign corporations under my proposal 
could be taxed as part of the individualized hybrid approach, and could include stock sale proceeds as 
well as dividends. 
154. Repurchases by corporations of their own stock should be taxed, though. If not, the 
shareholder tax could be deferred by substituting repurchases for dividends. This raises two concerns 
even assuming interest rate increases to the (undistributed) earnings and profit account, which 
generally maintains time value of money neutrality. See supra note 150. First, the deferral could 
continue indefinitely so long as repurchases are utilized. Second, the tax liability reflected by the 
earnings and profits account could dwarf the remaining corporate assets because the repurchases 
would distribute owners ' equity to the shareholders. In contrast to the dividend tax, which formally 
should be a shareholder tax, the tax on repurchases formally should be a corporate level tax for two 
reasons. First, a discontinuity would arise if shareholders were taxed on sales back to the corporation 
with an exemption for shareholder sales to third parties. Second, the appropriateness of the tax should 
tum on whether the funds would have been taxed if distributed by the corporation as a dividend, 
rather than the specific shareholder's gain. 
155. I.RC.§ 865(a)(2) (2005). 
156. David Cay Johnston, Overstating of Assets Is Seen To Cost U.S. Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 24, 2005, at C2 (noting significant underreporting of capital gains from stock sales and how the 
Bush administration would like to eliminate the capital gains tax). Separate from such misreporting, 
current law also treats sales gains more favorably than dividends for domestic shareholders because 
sales proceeds are taxable only to the extent they exceed the shareholder's stock cost. Furthermore, 
until recently, dividends were taxed at a higher rate than capital gains (in addition to the earlier basis 
recovery). 
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gains can be further deferred without interest, reducing the true tax cost 
under time value of money principles. 157 As such, the shareholder stock 
sale tax backstops the corporate income tax because the corporate 
income tax insufficiently taxes the cashed out gains of the selling 
stockholders. 158 In favorable contrast, a corporate consumption tax 
corrects for interest-free deferral. If taxes are deferred when 
stockholders sell the stock, there is a time value of money correction 
because the deferred taxable gains will increase over time by the risk-
free interest rate. 159 
B. NON-CORPORATE INVESTMENTS 
In addition to most corporate stock retums,100 the new blended 
approach would exempt three other investment categories from the 
Hybrid Approach's individual tax on non-wages. First, interest-bearing 
investments at, or near, the risk-free rate would be completely exempt 
from individual tax. This includes U.S. Treasury bonds and notes, bank 
157. A related explanation focuses on the purchase price paid by buyers for stock under a single, 
integrated corporate-level tax. See, e.g., Yin & Shakow, supra note 125, at 371-82. While the selling 
stockholders would not pay actual tax on stock sales under such regime, they should bear some 
implicit tax because a well-advised purchaser would discount the purchase price for stock in a 
corporation with appreciated value. This is because the tax burden on the purchaser's corporate 
investment will be determined by the corporation's (low) basis in its assets, rather than the individual 
purchaser's (high) basis in his stock. If investors bear the corporate tax, the purchaser assumes the 
built-in business tax. Reliance on such implicit tax is unsatisfactory under the income tax because the 
imbedded tax liability might be deferred indefinitely, without interest. Accordingly, the purchase price 
discount will be less due to the benefits of such interest-free deferral. 
158. See id. at 373-82. The tax shortfall arises even when accepting interest-free tax deferral until 
realization under the income tax. This is contrary to classic formulations of the income tax, which 
assume that income generally should be taxed as it accrues. See, e.g., the Haig-Simons formula , which 
defines income as the sum of consumption and changes in wealth. 
159. Under the corporate-level tax, the buyer effectively gets stuck with the corporation's low basis 
in its assets. Under the consumption tax, deferral is offset because the buyer's shortfall consists not 
only of the underlying basis differential, but also the risk-free exemption thereon. This results because 
deferred deductions under the consumption tax are increased by the risk-free interest rate. See supra 
text accompanying note 89. Accordingly, returning to the explanation supra note 157, the purchaser is 
more likely to discount the stock price for the full imbedded tax liability under the consumption tax. 
As part of a long-term agenda, the consumption tax's timing correction also might facilitate a 
market tax for (public) corporations. While the consumption tax's interest adjustments correct 
interest-free deferral, it nonetheless might be desirable to eliminate excessively long periods of tax 
deferral ( either from a revenue collection standpoint or because the interest rate is understated for 
very long deferral periods). An occasional market value check might appeal in this regard. 
Importantly, given the annual interest-free correction under the consumption tax, the market value 
check would not have to be applied on an annual basis, and imprecisions would be more acceptable. 
For example, every ten years or so, the corporation would have to pay tax to the extent its average 
market value over some recent period significantly exceeded its tax value (i.e., its basis in its assets). 
Such limited use should soften imperfections with intriguing market-based income taxes, which have 
been considered as annual income taxes. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman, A Market-Value Based Corporate 
Income Tax, TAX NoTES, Sept. II , 1995, at 1347, available at LEXIS 68 TAX NOTES 1347. 
16o. As discussed in the prior section, all returns from domestic corporations, as well as some from 
foreign corporations, would not be subject to the Hybrid Approach's individual tax on non-wages. 
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accounts, and money market accounts. The consumption tax's risk-free 
exemption supports this exclusion; the administrative benefits should 
outweigh any slight imperfections. 161 
Second, Roth IRA investments also would be exempt from 
individual tax. This is attractive on both administrative and transition 
grounds as such treatment would maintain the current tax exemption for 
Roth IRA accounts. 162 Similarly, current law could be maintained for 
other qualified retirement accounts such as traditional IRAs, 401(k) 
plans and 403(b) plans. Like current law, individuals would not pay any 
current tax on wages saved under such plans. At retirement, however, all 
withdrawals would be subject to tax at the regular rates. 163 
In sum, individuals could hold a variety of standard investments 
without any individual calculations of the Hybrid Approach's risk-free 
interest adjustments. In addition to providing further simplification, this 
161. There would be some imprecision due to (1) the exemption for returns approximating the 
risk-free rate, and (2) the different rates for different risk-free U.S. treasury investments. This differs 
from a proposal allowing taxpayers the option to exempt risky investments from a cash flow tax, 
relying on the assumption that risky investment returns are not burdened under a consumption tax. 
See TREASURY DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 119--27 (1977). Such a taxpayer option was 
criticized for its tax avoidance potential. Michael J. Graetz, Implementing a Progressive Consumption 
Tax, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1575, 1598-1610 (1979). The proposal here would be limited to nearly risk-free 
investments. 
162. Under I.RC. § 4o8A(d)(1), "qualified distributions from a Roth IRA [are not] includible in 
gross income." In addition to maintaining Roth IRA treatment for existing accounts at transition, 
taxpayers could be allowed to make new Roth IRA contributions from wages after enactment, subject 
to the current annual limitations. See infra note 163 for further discussion of Roth IRAs under the 
refined Hybrid Approach, including the reduced benefits thereunder. 
163. This is consistent with consumption tax treatment; recall, e.g., the cash flow version of the 
consumption tax. Like the Roth IRA, continuation could cover both existing retirement accounts in 
this category at transition and the ability to make new contributions, subject to the current limits. Such 
plans might not be as attractive under the consumption tax given the risk-free exemption (although 
currently, you have to relinquish the capital gains preference). Nonetheless, taxpayers still might like 
some retirement plans. Roth IRAs might be attractive due to the lack of reporting and inclusions. 
Regular IRAs and 401(k) investments allow a progressivity shift to the consumption date (and a way 
to avoid interest accounting). It is important, though, to maintain restrictions on retirement accounts 
to avoid opening back up the stand-alone wage concern (upon too much expansion of Roth IRA 
treatment) or the cash flow concerns (upon too much expansion of either regular IRAs or 401(k) plan 
treatment). 
The system might allow taxpayers an election to use their basis offset accounts from the Hybrid 
Approach investment tax as an offset against taxable retirement distributions from regular IRAs or 
401(k) plans. This would Jessen the chance of an unusable basis offset account. Importantly, though, if 
someone is not otherwise subject to the individual Hybrid investment tax, retirement accounts would 
not require the taxpayer to make any calculations under the individual Hybrid Approach. Separately, 
though, the system might want to allow some tax reduction for corporate stock held in a 401(k) plan. 
Taxing the investment return portion at the individual's regular tax rate upon withdrawal seems 
excessive given the lesser shareholder tax on corporate stock held outside a 401(k) plan. On the other 
hand, a similar point could be made about current Jaw because investing in corporate stock through a 
qualified retirement plan causes the individual to Jose the lower capital gains rate on dividends and 
stock sale gains, although the taxpayer does receive an offsetting interest-free deferral benefit. 
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new approach should resonate better with the public. 164 
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The X-tax and the Hybrid Approach took different paths to their 
overlapping recommendations for a progressive consumption tax. The X-
tax reacted to the conventional VA T's lack of tax-rate progressivity; the 
Hybrid Approach addressed revenue, transition, and tax avoidance 
concerns under the traditional cash flow tax. Together, these two 
independent proposals reinforce the merits of implementing a 
consumption tax, in part, through a progressive wage tax. The further 
overlap between these two independent proposals underscores the 
importance of a supplementary tax on consumption less wages. In 
addition to raising revenue and protecting the wage tax base, such 
supplementary tax highlights the serious flaw in the traditional 
assumption that a consumption tax comparatively exempts all investment 
return. 
Moving beyond their shared characteristics, a comparison of these 
dual consumption taxes highlights important differences. The X-tax 
makes a number of significant structural changes to current law, 
intensifying potential transition and related objections. In contrast, the 
Hybrid Approach favorably works within the current framework, 
changing the current individual tax only to exempt the risk-free return 
and eliminate the capital gains preference. Both changes target the 
loopholes arising from the realization requirement, long recognized as 
"the Achilles Heel of the Income Tax. "165 On the other hand, the X-tax 
furthers the administration of the consumption tax by limiting individual 
tax reporting to wages. 
My refined proposal combines the relative strengths of the X-tax 
and the Hybrid Approach. First, the current entity-level tax on 
corporations would be maintained, modified only to allow a risk-free 
exemption. Second, a low-rate shareholder dividend tax would be 
maintained as well. Despite its designation as a shareholder tax, this 
dividend tax could be calculated and collected by corporations, like the 
corporate-level tax. Finally, the exemption of designated investments 
from the Hybrid Approach's individual investment tax further enhances 
the administration of the tax. These critical, yet concentrated, changes 
ease the way to a more equitable, efficient, and administrable 
consumption tax. 
164. For a possible public perception objection to the interest calculations under the Hybrid 
Approach, see Bankman, supra note r , at 86--87. For a more general discussion of public perception 
constraints on taxation, see Zelinsky, supra note 39, at 947-55. 
165. See Andrews, supra note 64, at 278. 
